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"In these matters, the only certainty is that nothing is certain."
the Elder
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Pliny

ABSTRACT
The use of the phrase "reasonablemedical certainty" is common in highstakes child abuse legal trials. Yet, a review of cases since the phrase entered the
legal lexicon, as well as a survey of medicalprofessionals, reveals that the meaning
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of the phrase remains unclear. Using Pennsylvania as a case study, the Authors
surveyed legal professionals in the Commonwealth to examine their
understandingof the definition of the phrase. The Authors found there is limited
to no agreement on the meaning of the phrase within the community of legal
professionals. The lack of agreement is concerning given the common use of the
phrase in high-stakes child abuse cases. The risks of using the phrase in court
without an agreed-upon meaning are high: a perpetratorcan be found not guilty
or an innocent person can be erroneously convicted. To reduce the risks, the
Authors recommend that the legal field remove the phrasefrom the legal lexicon
or adopt a model definition that provides greaterclarity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Medical experts are often asked whether they can state their medical
opinion with "reasonable medical certainty" (RMC) when testifying in child
abuse cases. Though the meaning of the phrase' may seem self-explanatory
at first glance, in fact, there is a range of meanings attributed to this phrase
by attorneys, judges, and testifying witnesses, and often no definition is
assigned in the course of legal proceedings.2 As a result, there is a high risk
of expert testimony being misinterpreted with potential false convictions or
improper exonerations in child abuse cases.
The lack of a clear definition of the phrase creates a high risk of
negative consequences for children who experience abuse and for the
alleged perpetrators. 3 Specifically, a false negative, where a court finds the
alleged perpetrator did not abuse the child, risks returning the child back to
4
an environment where the child is potentially susceptible to further abuse.
Moreover, a false negative leaves a child abuse perpetrator free to commit
further abuses against the child victim and other potentially vulnerable
children. 5 In the case of a false positive, where the court finds the child abuse
did occur even though abuse did not occur, the alleged abuser can face
serious legal consequences, including prison time and loss of custody of a
6
child.
These high-stakes cases mandate the need for cross-collaboration
between the legal and medical fields and for mechanisms to reduce risk. For
decades, the cross-collaboration has focused on medical professionals
providing supporting evidence in child abuse cases regardless of the
1. In an effort to facilitate the discussion, the use of "the phrase" throughout the
Article refers to "reasonable medical certainty" and its variants, which may include but
are not limited to: "reasonable degree of medical certainty," "reasonable medical
probability," and "reasonable scientific certainty."
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part IV.B.
4. See infra Part IV.B.1.
5. See infra Part IV.B.1.
6. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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understanding of the phrase.7 The supporting evidence has helped fact
finders reach informed outcomes on the issues presented in child abuse
cases. Going forward, these two disciplines will continue to collaborate in
child abuse cases. Risk-reduction mechanisms would strengthen the crosscollaboration and benefit all parties involved by providing further clarity for
testifying physicians, attorneys, judges, and families facing child abuse
allegations.8
The goal of this Article is to offer strategies for risk reduction by
highlighting the present, pressing issues with the lack of understanding of the
legal phrase. The Article first will provide background information on the
history and evolution of the phrase in the legal field.9 The background is
important in understanding the current lack of understanding of the phrase's
definition. Next, the Article will present a survey and analysis of use of the
phrase in child abuse cases across the United States throughout the
decades. 10 Then, the Article will discuss and analyze a survey of the
Pennsylvania legal community's understanding of the phrase. 1 Finally, the
Article will discuss how the current understanding of the phrase in the legal
field, as partially illustrated by the survey in Pennsylvania, carries high risks
for children and alleged perpetrators.1 2 The Authors will propose potential
mechanisms to provide better clarity and reduce risks moving forward. 13 The
legal field should promote a clearer definition of this phrase or create a
formal, written standard that provides guidance for medical professionals
who serve as medical expert witnesses in child abuse cases. The risk of an
erroneous definition is too great and could have highly detrimental
consequences. Though a common practice is to allow testifying physicians to
come to their own understanding of the phrase, without that standard being
specified, we simply cannot accept that "[the phrase] is whatever you say [the
'14
phrase] is, doctor.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part IV.C.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. See infra Part III. The survey focuses on the Pennsylvania legal community as
an example of what we believe is a nationwide concern. We chose Pennsylvania both
because this is the area where the Authors are based and because the Pennsylvania legal
community serves as a comparison point with a prior study of medical professionals'
understanding of the phrase.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part IV.C.
14. Mark S. Dias et al., Defining 'Reasonable Medical Certainty' in Court: What
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II. BACKGROUND

A. Brief History and Evolution of the Phrase
The phrase "reasonable medical certainty" originated in the late 1800s
to early 1900s in Illinois. 15 Jeff L. Lewin's seminal article on the genesis and
evolution of reasonable medical certainty attributes the creation of the
phrase to Illinois lawyers' attempt to accommodate the tension between the
reasonable-certainty rule and the ultimate-issue rule adopted in the late
1800s and early 1900s in Illinois. 16 While attorneys in Illinois began using
variants of the phrase to preface questions about causation as early as 1913,17
it was not until 1916 that the phrase "reasonable certainty" finally appeared
in a legal opinion within the reasonable medical certainty context in FellowsKimbrough v. Chicago City Railway Co., a personal injury case.18 The phrase
reasonable certainty and its variants did not appear in other personal injury
appellate cases between 1916 to 1930.19 Then, starting in 1931, the phrase
reasonable medical certainty (or reasonable degree of medical certainty)
resurfaced in workers' compensation cases. 20 In effect, by the 1930s,
Does It Mean to Medical Experts in Child Abuse Cases?, 50 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
218,224 (2015).
15. Jeff L. Lewin, The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Uncertainty About
"ReasonableMedical Certainty",57 MD. L. REV. 380,407 (1998).
16. Id. at 407-10. The reasonable-certainty rule was used as a standard of proof to
qualify medical opinions regarding future injuries when establishing damages. Id. at 408.
The ultimate-issue rule prohibited medical opinions that expressed definitiveness or
certainty regarding issues of causation of existing injuries. Id. at 410.
17. Id. at 417.
18. Fellows-Kimbrough v. Chi. City Ry. Co., 111 N.E. 499,502 (II. 1916) ("Doctor,
referring to the [supposititious] or hypothetical patient and taking into account the
elements of the hypothesis, have you an opinion as a medical man, and based upon
reasonablecertainty, as to what was the cause of the neurasthenia and the tumor in the
hypothetical patient?"(emphasis added)), overruled in part by Clifford-Jacobs Forging
Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 166 N.E.2d 582 (11. 1960).
19. See Lewin, supra note 15, at 420.
20. See Burns v. Indus. Comm'n, 191 N.E. 225,229 (Ill.
1934) ("[I]n [the physician's]
opinion, based upon the hypothetical question and upon a reasonable medical certainty,
changes took place due to the inhalation of the fumes."); Ford Motor Co. v. Indus.
Comm'n, 192 N.E. 345, 346 (Ill. 1934) ("A hypothetical question based upon the
circumstances of the injury and its after-effects was propounded to the witness. [The
physician] answered that there is a direct causal relation, with a reasonable degree of
medical certainty ....
"); Plano Foundry Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 190 N.E. 255, 260 (Iln.
1934) ("The six medical witnesses for the petitioner, in response to the hypothetical
questions, testified in substance that as a matter of reasonable medical certainty death
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attorneys in Illinois had adopted the phrase into the normal lexicon in
personal injury cases and beyond. 21 Irving Goldstein then published his 1935
manual, Trial Technique, presenting examples of hypothetical questions
including the phrase reasonable medical certainty that attorneys could use
when examining testifying physicians. 22 The incorporation of the phrase into
the hypothetical questions included in the manual reflected the pervasive
use of the phrase in Illinois 23 but also gave credence to the phrase and

promoted its continuous usage among Illinois trial attorneys. 24 Goldstein,
however, did not explain or define the phrase anywhere in the manual.2 5 As
of the mid-1930s, the phrase did not appear to carry any legal weight. 26
However, in 1937 in Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Industrial Commission, the
court found the evidence in support of the award insufficient because the
expert witness physician failed to testify to "any reasonable medical
certainty of a causal relationship between the blow on the head and the
employee's total break down. '27 The court did not offer any definition or

was caused by endocarditis .... The four physicians testifying for the respondents on the
cause of death, in response to hypothetical questions, stated, as a matter of reasonable
medical certainty... ."); Allith-Prouty Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 185 N.E. 267, 268 (Ill.
1933) ("[The testifying physician] stated, also, that it was his opinion that the existence
of such a causal relation was within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.... He
stated that it was his opinion that it is within a reasonable degree of medical certainty
that a man working under the conditions of the employment of the deceased was exposed
to a greater risk of being injured by the elements than were the public generally .... );
Sanitary Dist. v. Indus. Comm'n, 175 N.E. 372, 374 (Il. 1931) ("[The physician] testified
that from the fact, as he had been informed, that English's decline began after the
accident, the submerging in the water of the canal could, with reasonable medical
certainty, aggravate a pre-existing nervous tension and increase it to a point where
eventually he became disabled.").
21. See Lewin, supra note 15, at 424-25.
22. E.g., IRVING GOLDSTEIN, TRIAL TECHNIQUE 455-57 (1935). This part is one of
several throughout where "reasonable certainty" is referred to. See id. passim.
23. Goldstein explained in the Trial Technique's preface that he collected the
illustrations included in the manual "from more than a thousand records of actual cases
tried by leading and successful trial attorneys" practicing in the Illinois appellate court
in Chicago. Id. at v.
24. 1 IRVING GOLDSTEIN & FRED LANE, TRIAL TECHNIQUE iii (2d ed. 1969)
(emphasizing in the preface, "This all time 'best seller' has guided more trial lawyers
safely and successfully through the stormy seas of litigation than any other single book
in the history of law.").
25. Lewin, supra note 15, at 431.
26. Id. at 426.
27. Shell Petrol. Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 10 N.E.2d 352, 354 (Ill. 1937).
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as
explanation of the phrase, implying its definition was self-evident.

The popularity of the phrase reasonable certainty and its variants
expanded beyond Illinois in subsequent decades into other states across the
United States and into federal courts. 29 The years between 1935 and 1960
marked a period of dissemination. 0 The phrase reasonable medical certainty
made its first appearance outside of Illinois in 1941 in the Michigan case Cole
v. Simpson.31 The phrase reasonable medical certainty also appeared in New
York, Texas, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Wisconsin, Indiana, and
Ohio cases during the same decade. 32 During the 1950s, 12 more states
adopted the phrase into their legal lexicon.33 Secondary sources also began
discussing the phrase and perceived meaning in the literature and34
encouraging its usage among attorneys prefacing questions for physicians.
By the 1960s, the phrase became so prominent that all but two states had
incorporated the phrase in their legal opinions. 35 However, as the phrase
spread, the definition remained largely unknown, with judges and other legal
professionals accepting the phrase without any clear explanation of its
meaning. 36 The result is a lack of coherence in either37definitions or consensus
across and throughout the legal and medical fields.
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., Alexander v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1933) ("Q.
Based upon the above assumption of facts have you an opinion as to whether or not the
hypothetical individual received injuries evidenced by the abrasions or bruises which
with a reasonable degree of medical certainty might or could have caused the cerebral
hemorrhage resulting in the death of the hypothetical individual? ... Q. Have you an
opinion as to whether or not the accident which was evidenced by the abrasions or
contusions discovered on the forehead and cheek of the hypothetical individual might or
could have had, with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, a causal connection with
the death of the hypothetical individual?"); Vaccaro v. Marra Bros., Inc., 130 F. Supp.
12, 13 (E.D. Pa. 1955) ("Have you an opinion with reasonable medical certainty as to
whether or not there was causal relation between the traumatic incident on the
pier.., and the coronary conditions... ?"); DeVirgiliis v. Gordon, 243 A.2d 459, 460
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1968).
30. See Lewin, supra note 15, at 430-55.
31. Cole v. Simpson, 1 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Mich. 1941) ("[The doctor] was asked whether
he had any opinion based upon reasonable medical certainty whether or not the findings
.
he 'had made could have been caused by a fall or being dragged .
32. See Lewin, supra note 15, at 437-38.
33. Id. at 438.
34. Id. at 455-56.
35. Id. at 456.
36. Id. at 458.
37. Molly Gena, Comment, Shaken Baby Syndrome: Medical Uncertainty Casts
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B. DisparateTreatment: A Survey of the Use of RMC in Child Abuse Cases
Ambiguity in the meaning of the phrase raises concerns regarding the
testimony of medical professionals in a range of cases. This Article focuses
on the narrower area of expert testimony in child abuse cases because these
cases exemplify the problems arising from the ambiguity of reasonable
medical certainty. These cases are often high stakes for all participants;
young age, medical conditions, or both can prevent alleged victims from
testifying, and expert testimony may be crucial to reaching a verdict.38
Reliance on the phrase RMC in child abuse cases is a relatively recent
phenomenon, having only gained widespread use in the 1980s.3 9
The following Part presents child abuse cases that helped establish
RMC (or one of its variants) in the context of expert testimony concerning
the occurrence of child abuse, the timing of injuries related to alleged abuse,
or both. This Part will note if the phrase is used in a different context. Noting
its increased use throughout the decades, 40 this Part will focus on cases in
which attorneys, physicians, or judges reference reasonable medical
certainty.
1. The Early Days: 1940s-1970s
RMC appeared in a child abuse case as early as 1944. In State v.
Plunkett, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder of his fivemonth-old child. 41 During the trial, the state asked an expert physician:
Q. From your testimony, which you have just given, and based upon
reasonable medical certainty, do you have an opinion as to what might
have caused the death of the child?" [The physician proceeded to
explain his opinion:] "A. From the examination and appearance of the
child's face, it occurred to me that a large hand could have been in that
manner (indicating hand spread over face with fingers spread and
extended) been placed on the baby's face. From a careful examination
Doubt on Convictions, 2007 Wis. L. REV. 701, 716-18 (2007) (describing the lack of
agreed definition in the medical and legal fields); see generally Dias et al., supra note 14.
38. See, e.g., Galloway v. State, 122 So. 3d 614, 666-67 (Miss. 2013) (quoting Schulz
v. Celotex Corp., 942 F.2d 204, 597 (3d Cir. 1991)).
39. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
40. The following key search terms on LexisNexis yielded 1,292 cases: (reasonable
w/4 medial w/2 certainty AND (child or minor or underage or baby or kid)) w/5 (abuse
or murder or assault or harassment).
41. State v. Plunkett, 149 P.2d 101, 103, 105-06 (Nev. 1944).
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of the child's face I cannot see how the injury could occur from an
42
accidental injury, for instance, a fall.
The court went on to explain that a physician is allowed to testify as to
the cause of the injury and to explain that the opinion rendered was based
on the judgment of the physician. 43 However, the court did not explain the
meaning of RMC and did not appear to give the phrase any particular legal
meaning or weight. 44
The phrase appeared again in a 1967 child abuse case in which a
medical expert testified that the crime was a product of the defendant's
mental disease. 45 The court explained the question was not appropriate
because the question was asking about outcome, rather than causation. 46 The
court then suggested how to phrase an appropriate question including the
phrase:
The correct form of question for counsel to put is to ask the expert
to assume, but only for purposes of the case, that the accused did in fact
commit the act charged and then inquire if the expert has an opinion
based on reasonable medical certainty whether there is any causal
relationship between the assumed act and the mental abnormality he
has described.

47

The court did not explain what RMC meant but did imply that the use
of the phrase was required, or at least strongly recommended its use when
examining experts.48
The 1970s saw a slow growth in the use of RMC in child abuse cases;
however, the Authors found no documented discussion about its meaning or
how much legal emphasis should be accorded to the phrase. 49 People v.
Ewing is a noteworthy case from this decade because without further
explanation or discussion, the court placed emphasis on the phrase, noting

42. Id. at 107 (emphasis added).
43. Id.

44. See id.
45. Harried v. United States, 389 F.2d 281, 285 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

46. Id.
47. Id.

48. See id.
49. See, e.g., People v. Ewing, 140 Cal. Rptr. 299 passim (Ct. App. 1977); In re T. Y.
K., 598 P.2d 593, 594 (Mont. 1979); In re Phillips, No. 78AP-371, 1978 WL 217263, at *2

(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 1978); Commonwealth v. Blevins, 309 A.2d 421, 425 (Pa. 1973).
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its importance with quotation marks.50 The electronic database utilized for
scanning case law recognized the implied importance of the phrase, and
subsequently included RMC in the case summary and encouraged the use of
51
the phrase by including the phrase in the case headnotes.
2. Decades of Diffusion: 1980s-1990s
During the 1980s, the use of RMC proliferated, as did the need to
understand its meaning. As courts increasingly referenced the importance of
RMC,it became the subject of greater discussion. For example, in State v.
Jurgens, the defendant argued that the state had not met its burden of proof
(requiring guilt beyond a reasonable doubt) because the expert testified only
to a reasonable medical certainty that the injuries were non-accidental. 52 In
response to the defendant's argument, the court explained that
circumstantial evidence, including the medical testimony, was sufficient to
support a conviction. 53 The defendants in Commonwealth v. Hart raised a
similar argument, disputing the sufficiency of the state's evidence, alleging
that a conviction required greater certainty than the expert physician's
50. Ewing, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 300 ("Both doctors testified to 'a reasonable medical
certainty' that the child was a victim of the battered child syndrome.").
51. The third headnote in Ewing indexed "Infants § 16-Offenses Against
Infants-Child Abuse-Sufficiency of Evidence-Appeal" reads:
On appeal by defendant from a conviction of abusing a child of thirteen months
under circumstances likely to produce great bodily harm or death . ..,there was
substantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that defendant
had deliberately inflicted severe injuries on the child, where, although
defendant's denial of guilt formed the only direct evidence, two doctors who
examined the child when she was brought to the hospital suffering from three
separate subdural hematomas, one of which proved fatal, testified to a
reasonable medical certainty that the child was a victim of the battered child
syndrome ....
"
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
52. State v. Jurgens, 424 N.W.2d 546, 555 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); see also Roden v.
Solem, 431 N.W.2d 665, 669 (S.D. 1988) (describing the defendant's argument that the
doctor failed to qualify the conclusion with reasonable medical certainty but lacking
further discussion on the defendant's argument); State v. McIntosh, No. 85-27-II, 1986
WL 5880, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 23, 1986) (describing that "[t]he medical
testimony showed that the physical condition of the eleven-year old was consistent with
penetration, although it could not be established with reasonable medical certainty" and
explaining the defendant's argument that the evidence was not sufficient to support a
conviction).
53. Jurgens, 424 N.W.2d at 555.
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testimony that reasonable medical certainty existed. 54 The court responded
as follows:
While a conviction may not be based on suspicion or surmise, the
Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty and
may rely wholly on circumstantial evidence....
Appellants' challenge to their convictions of murder is an attack on
the testimony of the medical examiner. Doctor Catherman was unable
to state the cause and manner of Misty's death with absolute certainty,
but he repeatedly stated that he held his opinion with "a reasonable
degree of medical certainty." ... [T]he doctor's testimony established
far more than a probability that Misty's death was caused by a criminal
act.55
In this case, the court might not have defined the meaning of RMC, but
it did provide insight into how the court conceptualized the phrase.5 6 First,
the court indicated that RMC was distinct from both mathematical certainty
and absolute certainty.5 7 Second, the court noted that RMC implied "far
more than a probability. '58 However, even with its expanded discussion, the
court's explanation remained somewhat vague because it focused on what
RMC is not, rather than what it is.59 Third, the court's ruling implied that
6
RMC was sufficient to establish the connection needed for legal judgment. 0
During the 1980s, there was minimal overt discussion of RMC, but the
use of the phrase was frequently reinforced in legal proceedings. Courts
often incorporated RMC in their opinions in passing, implying its
importance while at the same time failing to explain either its legal weight or
explicit definition. 61 For example, in United States v. Lingle the court implied
54. Commonwealth v. Hart, 501 A.2d 675, 677 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) ("Appellants
argue that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt . .
55. Id. (internal citations omitted).
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.

61. Ex rel J.A.J., 652 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) ("In conclusion, Dr.
Venglarcik found, based upon a reasonable medical certainty, that M.J.D. was a victim
of parental abuse because he suffered a 'constellation of injuries [which were] not
adequately explained by the history given."' (alteration in original)); see also Pinkerton
v. State, 784 P.2d 671, 677 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) ("She claims that none of the
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physicians who testified for the prosecution could state with reasonable medical
certainty whether R.J. would have lived had she taken the child to the hospital earlier.");
State v. Bass, 385 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Iowa 1986) ("[C]an you state then in terms of
reasonable medical certainty an opinion about the possibility of 9:30 p.m. being the time
the injuries were received? A. In my opinion it would be exceedingly unlikely....");
State v. Pollard, 719 S.W.2d 38, 41-42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) ("PROSECUTOR: Now,
based upon your examination of the victim in this case, [S.J.'s name deleted], based upon
your training and expertise as a pediatrician and as a staff pediatrician at Cardinal
Glennon Memorial Hospital, based upon the examination you have performed as a
pediatrician at Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital of children within the bounds of
reasonable medical certainty, do you have a conclusion as to whether your findings are
consistent with some type of anal penetration? A. There's no doubt in my mind."
(alteration in original)); State v. Closterman, 687 S.W.2d 613, 617 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
("Do you have an opinion consistent with reasonable medical certainty of the cause of
death? ... Did you, from the examination do you have an opinion consistent with
reasonable medical certainty of the cause of death?"); State v. Forrester, No. CA-88-7,
1989 WL 75749, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 21, 1989) ("Dr. Tate did state within a
reasonable medical certainty that the child had died due to blunt force trauma to the
head. This was irreconcilable with any reasonable theory of the Defendant's
innocence."); State v. Boston, No. 13017, 1988 WL 26184, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 2,
1988) ("Dr. Asch also testified that 'probable' meant 95 to 99 percent certainty while
'possible' meant being greater than 50 percent. Boston asserts that the expert's opinion
must be based on reasonable medical certainty and not mere possibility .... However,
all that is required is that the context and phrasing of the doctor's statement make it clear
that she is testifying that something is at least more likely than not .... The doctor
explained that 'possible' meant more likely than not."), rev'd on other grounds, 545
N.E.2d 1220, 1240 (Ohio 1989); State v. Wagner, 508 N.E.2d 164, 165 (Ohio Ct. App.
1986) ("The doctor opined within reasonable medical certainty that the child had
suffered trauma to his anal area consistent with sexual abuse."); State v. Schneider, C.A.
No. L-84-214, No. L-84-214, 1984 WL 3719, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 1984) ("Q.
Now, Doctor, did you also reach an opinion, based upon a reasonable medical certainty
as to the cause of death of Patricia Schneider? A. Yes."); State v. Golebiewski, No. L83-306, 1984 WL 7877, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. May 11, 1984) ("The doctor further testified,
based on reasonable medical certainty, that the injuries to the vaginal area were caused
by an instrument consistent with the diameter of a toy plastic gun which was found at the
scene of the crime.");Ex rel. T.L.J., 303 N.W.2d 800, 805 (S.D. 1981) ("That according to
the expert medical testimony of the treating physician, Dr. Haase, the injuries and the
pattern thereof suffered by T.L.J. were, based upon the medical history, consistent with
injuries by a hot liquid and were, based upon a reasonable medical certainty, of a type
classically described as an immersion type bum, which is generally not accidental in
nature."); State v. Perry, No. 1237, 1989 WL 128527, at *1-2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 25,
1989) ("Are you saying, doctor, that in your medical opinion within a reasonable medical
certainty what you found in examining this child, the opening to the hymen was
consistent with her history of two finger pene-or digital penetration? A. Yes, sir."); Ebert
v. Kettner, 447 N.W.2d 62, 63 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) ("He conceded on cross-examination
that Dawn had reportedly handled her appearance in criminal proceedings very well,
that she may handle court stress 'better than an average patient,' and that he could not,
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the importance of RMC.6 2 Yet the court did not offer any discussion of the
phrase beyond appending the words "beyond any" in front of the phrase,
63
thereby distinguishing it from absolute certainty.
The 1980s also saw the use of RMC in two opposing categorical
approaches. One approach adopted by courts required RMC as the legal
standard to establish causation. 64 In the second approach, the courts held
that the expert physician did not need to assert reasonable medical certainty
in order to corroborate abuse. 65 In both approaches, the courts did not
to a reasonable medical certainty, attribute Dawn's prior behavior difficulties to the
alleged assault.").
62. See United States v. Lingle, 27 M.J. 704,706 (A.F.C.M.R. 1988).
63. See id. ("In Dr. Talarico's experience an accidental spiral fracture is 'very, very
unlikely' in a three year old child, and it was 'beyond any reasonable medical certainty'
that the injury was an accident."(emphasis added)).
64. State v. New, Nos. 11-171, 11-259, 1986 WL 14588, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec.
19, 1986) ("The test as to the admissibility of the opinion of a doctor is as follows: [T]he
witness must connect the [symptoms with the alleged abuse] with a reasonable medical
certainty. Probability, and not possibility is required." (first alteration in original)); State
v. Holland,' 346 N.W.2d 302, 311 (S.D. 1984) (Henderson, J., dissenting) ("When in the
course of this murder-manslaughter prosecution, the State must prove cause of death,
said causation must be established within a reasonable medical certainty."); see also
Miller v. State, 448 N.E.2d 293, 296 (Ind. 1983) (explaining that the expert physician
qualified his different conclusions to a reasonable medical certainty but lacking
explanation or definition of the phrase); State v. Ostlund, 416 N.W.2d 755, 758-60 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987) (quoting excerpts from the expert testimony offered at trial, each excerpt
including the phrase reasonable medical certainty but lacking further explanation as to
the significance or meaning of the phrase); State v. Applegate, 668 S.W.2d 624,632 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1984) (insinuating the importance of the phrase by explaining how the expert
continuously reached medical conclusions to a reasonable medical certainty but lacking
further explanation as to the significance or meaning of the phrase); State v. Lima, 546
A.2d 770, 773-74 (R.I. 1988) ("This court has long held that we require that expert
testimony speak in terms of strong probability, not mere possibility.... Adams does not
require of the expert the use of the talismanic phrase 'strong probability.' The expert
must merely testify to the effect that he reached his conclusion with reasonable medical
certainty."), superseded by statute, 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-9-5.3 (West 2018), as
recognized in State v. Sivo, 925 S.2d 901 (R.I. 2007).
65. State v. Coleman, 426 N.W.2d 889, 894 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) ("[The doctor]
could not say to a reasonable medical certainty there was penetration because internal
exams are not customarily done on children ....

Her testimony, however, was sufficient

to corroborate that of N.H. that penetration occurred."); see also Strong v. State, 538
N.E.2d 924, 931 (Ind. 1989) ("[N]o threshold level of certainty or conclusiveness is
required in an expert's opinion as a prerequisite to its admissibility. Assuming the subject
matter is one which is appropriate for expert testimony and that a proper foundation has
been laid, the expert's opinion or conclusion that, in the context of the facts before the
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address the meaning of RMC.
The use of RMC in child abuse cases continued to rise in the first half
of the 1990s 66 but then declined. Lengthy discussions of RMC remained

lacking, with courts using the phrase in passing without further analysis of its
legal significance. 67 As previously, some courts required the phrase to prove
witness, a particular proposition is 'possible,' 'could have been,' 'probable,' or
'reasonably certain' all serve to assist the finder of fact in intelligently resolving the
material factual questions." (alteration in original) (quoting Noblesville Casting Div. of
TRW, Inc. v. Prince, 438 N.E.2d 722, 731 (Ind.1982))).
66. A search in LexisNexis with the following terms yielded a semi bell curve,
between the years 1990 and 1999, peaking in the year 1994: (reasonable w/2 medical w/2
certainty AND (child or minor or underage or baby or kid) w/5 (abuse or murder or
assault or harassment)).
67. State v. Sirimanochanh, 602 A.2d 1029, 1031 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992) ("He
further testified that there could be sexual touching without penetration, and he could
not testify with reasonable medical certainty that there had not been any sexual
touching."), rev'd, 620 A.2d 761 (Conn. 1993); State v. Dollinger, 568 A.2d 1058, 1060
(Conn. App. Ct. 1990) ("[The physician] testified that, to a reasonable medical certainty,
V's injuries were caused by sexual molestation."); Ellibee v. Ellibee, 826 P.2d 462, 467
(Idaho 1992) ("Dr. Weber observed nine bruises on Tolen's left thigh and buttock that,
with reasonable medical certainty, appeared to be approximately 48 hours old.... [T]he
bruises were consistent with a severe spanking .. ");Goodson v. State, 566 So. 2d 1142,
1155 (Miss. 1990) ("Dr. Chidester was then asked whether 'based upon your experience
as a doctor, and in the area of gynecology, and upon reasonable medical certainty,' did
such behavior indicate anything to her."); Ex. rel. T.L.C., 566 So. 2d 691,700 (Miss. 1990)
("Given your experience and your background working in the Trauma Center, and given
the location of the bruises-the coloration of the bruises, as you have identified themdo you have an opinion, to a reasonable medical certainty, as to whether or not these
bruises are consistent with a fall.... Do you have an opinion, Ms. Dubard, given your
education and experience, to a reasonable medical certainty as to the origin of these
bruises as you have described them on this child, TLC?"), overruled by In re J.T., 188 So.
3d 1192 (Miss. 2016); State v. Grant, No. 83 C.A. 144,1990 WL 176825, at *15 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 9, 1990) ("Dr. Belinky testified he... was familiar with the levels of carbon
monoxide sufficient to cause death with reasonable medical certainty .... Dr. Belinky

stated with reasonable medical certainty that the infants were not unconscious prior to
the flames attacking their skin."); State v. Phillips, No. 11576, 1990 WL 42316, at *4
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 10, 1990) ("Doctor, then, do you have an opinion, within a
reasonable medical certainty, after conducting your examination of Tiffannie on that
particular day as to how that injury was inflicted?"); Ex rel J.J., 454 N.W.2d 317, 322
(S.D. 1990) ("Two physicians, a gynecologist and a pediatrician, examined [S.J.] and
concluded to a reasonable medical certainty that she had been sexually assaulted."
(alteration in original)); State v. Young, 802 P.2d 829, 832-33 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)
("Based on the thousands of examinations she had personally conducted, consultation
with other professionals, and existing literature, J.'s vaginal opening size was 'abnormal
to a reasonable medical certainty."').
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causation, 68 and defendants continued to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence because the expert failed to include the phrase in the expert
testimony. 69 Other courts differentiated RMC from the required burden of
proof but did not explicate the phrase. 0 Finally, some courts began to

68. Floray v. State, 720 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Del 1998) ("Generally when an expert
offers a medical opinion it should be stated in terms of 'a reasonable medical probability'
or 'a reasonable medical certainty."' (quoting Oxendine v. State, 528 A.2d 870,873 (Del.
1987)); State v. Stribley, 532 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) ("Defendant
contends [the physician]'s opinion evidence should not have been admitted and the
admission of [the physician]'s opinion was contingent on his determining it was based on
reasonable medical certainty.... We agree with defendant,. Webb supports the
proposition the State needs to prove the causation element in a murder case by evidence
that shows reasonable medical certainty."); State v. Carlson, 906 P.2d 999, 1001 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1995) ("After further argument from counsel, the trial court ruled that Dr.
Feldman could testify 'so as far as rendering an opinion with reasonable medical
certainty that [E] is a victim of sexual abuse .... ' (alteration in original) (quoting Report
of Proceedings at 731)); see also Bergmann v. State, 486 N.E.2d 653, 657 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985) (citing Palace Bar, Inc. v. Feamot, 381 N.E.2d 858, 824 (Ind. 1978)) ("Ramsey's
answer was not PalaceBar mere speculation. Ramsey's response was probative evidence
because it was based upon reasonable medical certainty."); Walker v. State, 671 So. 2d
581, 603 (Miss. 1995) (implying the necessity of the phrase to prove causation when an
expert testifies, stating, "In order for the State to meet its burden of proving the crime
of capital murder beyond a reasonable doubt, the cause of death can be established by
expert medical testimony. Dr. McGarry opined within a reasonable medical certainty
that Edwards' death resulted from the combination of the injury to her neck and being
held underwater, resulting in asphyxiation."); Skeen v. State, 481 S.E.2d 129, 132 (S.C.
1997) ("When asked whether the examination indicated Joe was sexually abused, Dr.
Baker stated that she could not determine 'with any reasonable medical certainty
whether or not he... was sexually abused[,]"' implying the need for the phrase).
69. Nation v. Colla, 841 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) ("The trial court also
denied a motion in limine in which Colla asked the court to prohibit evidence on the
death of James Nation since there was no expert that could testify to any degree of
reasonable medical certainty that Colla caused the death of James Nation."); State v.
Valdez, No. 90-OT-014, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 5691, at *29 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 29,
1991) ("Appellant argues that this evidence fails to meet certainty requirements, is
prejudicial and, since Dr. Ferrer was unable to express an opinion concerning this issue
in terms of reasonable medical certainty or probability, must be excluded.").
70. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Melchionno, 558 N.E.2d 18, 21 (Mass. Ct. App.
1990) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lewandowski, 491 N.E.2d 670, 671 (Mass. Ct. App.
1986)) ("That the physician gave his opinion that the exhibited symptoms were to a
,reasonable medical certainty' the product of sexual abuse did not dilute the standard of
proof (beyond a reasonable doubt) which applies in a criminal case."); State v. J.Q., 599
A.2d 172, 190 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (Stem, J., dissenting) ("Doctors can offer
their opinions as to causation based on reasonable medical certainty and without belief
beyond a reasonable doubt.").
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explain that the phrase was not necessary so long as the expert provided
some degree of certainty in the medical conclusion provided in court. 71
3. An Attempt to Understandthe Phrase in an Era of Its Proliferation:The
2000s-2010s
With the new century, a few courts began to advance varying
understandings of the phrase in legal proceedings. So while many courts
continued the use of RMC without further explanation, 72 some allowed

71. See Eversley v. State, 748 So. 2d 963, 968 (Fla. 1999) ("In a criminal case expert
medical opinion as to cause of death does not need to be stated with reasonable medical
certainty. Such testimony is competent if the expert can show that, in his opinion, the
occurrence could cause death or that the occurrence might have or probably did cause
death." (quoting Delap v. State, 440 SO. 2d 1242, 1253 (Fla. 1983))), superseded by
statute, FLA. STAT ANN. § 782.07 (West 2018), as recognized in Bayer v. State, 788 So. 2d
310 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001); In re F.A.P., No. 69,104, 1994 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 559,
at *18-20 (Kan. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 1994) (explaining after only one doctor of six testified
to a reasonable medical certainty that "[n]o magic words are necessary when an expert
medical witness gives an opinion" so long as the experts "g[i]ve opinions that show within
a reasonable medical probability" that abuse occurred); In re Samuel W., No. A-98-720,
1999 WL 170021, at *16 (Neb. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1999) (citing Paulsen v. State, 541
N.W.2d 636,643 (Neb. 1996)) ("An expert opinion is to be judged in view of the entirety
of the expert's opinion and is not validated or invalidated solely on the basis of the
presence or lack of the magic words 'reasonable medical certainty."'); State v. Monk,
No. 96 CA 33, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4935, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 23, 1997) ("After
reviewing this report, Dr. Budin reached the conclusion, within the bounds of reasonable
medical certainty, that Melissa's genitalia showed no hymenal ring."); Fatimus v.
Fatimus, No. 95-T-5287, 1996 WL 210775, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1996) ("[W]e
are unable to say the trial court erred in its conclusion that no sexual abuse was
established, either on the basis of manifest weight or sufficiency. Significantly, not one
expert was able to conclude with certainty that abuse had occurred. A review of the
expert testimony reveals that some experts offered, at best, inconclusive opinions
regarding the validity of the sexual abuse charges, while others denied the validity of the
charges."); State v. Emerick, 670 N.E.2d 1060, 1063 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) ("In both cases,
we held that an opinion of an expert physician is no longer inadmissible merely because
it is not stated to a reasonable medical certainty .... "). But see State v. D'Ambrosio, 616
N.E.2d 909, 915 (Ohio 1993) ("While several decision from this court indicate that
speculative opinions by medical experts are inadmissible since they are based on
possibilities and not probabilities,.. . we believe that the better practice, especially in
criminal cases, is to let experts testify in terms of possibility.").
72. Leal v. Dretke, No. Civ.SA-99-CA-1301-RF, 2004 WL 2603736, at *13-14
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2004) (using the phrase without further explanation); United States
v. Ellis, 57 M.J. 375, 386 (C.A.A.F. 2002) ("During the cross-examination of Dr. Odom,
the trial counsel attempted to attack Dr. Odom's conclusion that he was confident to a
reasonable medical certainty that the child's fatal injury occurred some two to three
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weeks before June 4."); United States v. Ellis, 54 M.J. 958, 969 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App.
2001) ("When the cause of death can be established with reasonable medical certainty,
a report of the autopsy findings is made available to the State Attorney's office .... ");
People v. Uribe, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 829, 835 (Ct. App. 2008) ("From [the doctor's] review
of the records and photos, Dr. Hariton arrived at the conclusion that 'with reasonable
medical certainty this [penetrating trauma] did not happen."' (second alteration in
original)); Joshua P. v. Miranda P., No. B182239, 2005 WL 2416668, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App.
Sept. 30, 2005) ("In [the coroner's] opinion, to a reasonable medical certainty, Isabel's
death was a homicide."); People v. Vizcarra, No. E032384, 2004 WL 65269, at *2 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2004) ("It appeared that the trauma was inflicted and Dr. Mandi
suspected child abuse had caused Nicole's death to a reasonable medical certainty.");
Miranda G.-P. v. Superior Court, No. B176795, 2004 WL 2526000, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App.
Nov. 9, 2004) ("[I]n [the Deputy Medical Examiner's] opinion, to a reasonable medical
certainty, [the child's] death was a homicide."); Carl T. v. David T., No. B157827, 2003
WL 1950378, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2003) ("Dr. Grogan could not be sure to a
reasonable medical certainty that the X-ray technician did not displace the fracture.");
State v. Gonzalez, 864 A.2d 847, 868-69 (Conn. 2005) (Vertefeuille, J., dissenting) ("He
also acknowledged that he could not state, with any reasonable medical certainty, what
type of object had penetrated the victim."); State v. Nolan, 882 So. 2d 1246, 1251 (La. Ct.
App. 2004) ("Finally, [the doctor] opined that '[w]ith a reasonable medical certainty, this
child died of abusive head trauma and as well manifested prior trauma of likely an
abusive etiology that was not the fatal cause of death."' (second alteration in original));
State v. Arwood, 762 So. 2d 1266, 1269 (La. Ct. App. 2000) ("Dr. Benton opined, with
reasonable medical certainty, that this child sustained a blunt penetrating trauma to her
hymen, which was most likely of a non-accidental nature."); Cowin v. State, No. A051724, 2006 WL 1891746, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 11, 2006) ("Dr. Levitt testified to a
reasonable medical certainty that EP had been sexually abused."); In re Welfare of
A.L.H., No. CX-00-639, 2000 WL 1221616, at * 1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2000) ("On
March 11, 1999, A.L.H. was diagnosed with four acute broken ribs which, within all
reasonable medical certainty, were intentionally inflicted."); Sanderson v. State, 872 So.
2d 735, 738 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) ("When she was asked whether she had an opinion
based on reasonable medical certainty that Lulu had been sexually penetrated, Dr.
Chidester answered, 'Yes, I do."'); James v. State, 777 So. 2d 682, 693 (Miss. Ct. App.
2000) ("It was his opinion, based on a reasonable medical certainty, that the injuries to
Shenekqua had to occur prior to noon on June 7, 1995. It also was his opinion based on
a reasonable medical certainty that the various enzymes found in Shenekqua's blood at
elevated levels when she was admitted to the hospital.... "), rev'd on other grounds, 912
So. 2d 940, 953-54 (Miss. 2005); State v. Foster, 244 S.W.3d 800, 802-03 (Mo. Ct. App.
2008) ("Over objection, [the doctor] opined to a reasonable medical certainty that most
of the other 95% were sexually abused as well.... He believes this to a reasonable
medical certainty, as professional SAFE-CARE examiner."); State v. Molina, 713
N.W.2d 412, 425, 433 (Neb. 2006) (noting the expert witness physicians qualified their
medical conclusions with the phrase but offering no further explanation of the phrase);
In re Civil Commitment of C.R.M., No. SVP-263-02, 2006 WL 742185, at *4 (N.J. Mar.
23, 2006) (a psychiatrist's diagnosis stated: "It is my medical impression within a
reasonable medical certainty based upon his past history and current mental status that
he is a... Sexually Violent Predator [and] is more likely than not to commit future Sex
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physicians to offer their own definitions, or at least explain their own
Offenses." (alteration in original)); State v. Driver, No. COA03-103, 2004 WL 77831, at
*1 (N.C. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2004) ("My opinion at the completion of our evaluation was
that with reasonable medical certainty the patient had experienced and received the
medical diagnosis of sexual abuse."); Commonwealth v. Manila, No. 02-017-GA, 2005
WL 3771376, at *5 (N. Mar. I. Oct. 7, 2005) ("Now based upon your training, your
education and experience the autopsy you performed on six month old [N.R.M.] within
the bounds of reasonable medical certainty have you formed an expert opinion
concerning the cause of death of baby [N.R.M.]? ...In short, all of the medical experts
that gave their opinion to a medical certainty as to the cause of N.R.M.'s death stated
that the cause of death was Shaken Baby Syndrome." (alterations in original)); State v.
lacona, 752 N.E.2d 937, 950 (Ohio 2001) ("[A]nd after consultation with her colleagues,
she still was able, based on reasonable medical certainty to make the causative finding
of death by axphyxia.... Once again, despite a number of hypotheticals that were
presented, based not only on his investigation but on the evidence produced, he did not
waiver from his decision based on a medical certainty."); State v. Tribett, No. 04AP-828,
2006 WL 1826749, at *7, *11 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 2006) (noting the medical
physicians testified to a reasonable medical certainty but offering no further discussion
of the phrase); State v. Krull, 796 N.E.2d 979, 984 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) ("Defense
counsel for Hilt asked Dr. Lerer, '[D]o you have an opinion based upon reasonable
medical certainty as to whether or not this amounts to child abuse?"' (alteration in
original)); State v. Matheny, No. 2001AP070069, 2002 WL 386163, at *6-7 (Ohio Ct.
App. Mar. 6, 2002) ("[D]o you think, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
there would be any possible way you could make a finding at that point in time as to any
sexual abuse? ...[W]ould you expect, within a reasonable degree [of] medical certainty
that would be evidence to show trauma or something that might show abuse?"); State v.
Warren, 197 P.3d 605, 607 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) ("[W]e had a medical doctor testify to her
opinion within a medical reasonable certainty according to the-her training and her
experience." (alteration in original)); Commonwealth v. Scher, 803 A.2d 1204, 1226-28
(Pa. 2002) (explaining that the expert conclusions were qualified to a reasonable medical
certainty but not explaining the phrase any further); In re Mackenzie C., 877 A.2d 674,
686 (R.I. 2005) ("Doctor Raggio testified that, in her opinion, based upon reasonable
medical certainty, Mackenzie suffered from [a particular syndrome].
); Nunn v.
State, No. M2007-00974-CCA-R3-PC, 2008 WL 3843906, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug.
18, 2008) ("But if my diagnosis of voyeurism is correct, and as I said, I have within
reasonable medical certainty come to that conclusion, that the arousing part for him was
the voyeuristic part and he has consistently said that over the years."); Segura v. State,
No. 03-03-00685-CR, 2005 WL 2313559, at *3 (Tex. App. Sept. 23, 2005) ("[The
pediatrician] said therefore that 'seeing the cleft gets my attention,' but did not lead her
to say with 'reasonable medical certainty' that Y.G. had been abused."); State v.
Stensrud, No. 32819-4-11,2006 WL 2329474, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2006) ("[T]he
State's expert testified that there was no reasonable medical certainty that [failure to
clamp the umbilical cord] was a cause of death."); State v. Salzer, No. 23741-5-I1, 2001
WL 528231, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. May 18,2001) ("Dr. Soderstrom could not opine with
reasonable medical certainty whether C.'s hymenal tissue had been damaged by the
insertion of a penis or other object.").

2018]

UnreasonableRisks of "Reasonable Medical Certainty"

271

understanding of the phrase. 73 Other courts, however, emphasized the
distinction between RMC and certainty by appending "beyond a" in front of
the phrase, 74 sometimes comparing the phrase with other degrees of
certainty. 75 As such, defendants continued to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence when experts failed to use the phrase, 76 some courts continued to
73. Commonwealth v. Fields, No. 2005-CA-000960-MR, No. 2005-CA-0011017MR, 2007 WL 1720142, at *7 (Ky. Ct. App. June 15, 2007) ("Rather, [the doctor] could
not find any evidence indicating with a reasonable medical certainty, which he defined
as a 'nine-five percent confidence,' that the baby was born alive."); Bridges v. Paquin,
No. 286428, 2009 WL 457927, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2009) ("Diaz conceded that
he lacked 'reasonable' medical certainty by a preponderance of the evidence available
to him that Michael's death qualified as a homicide."); State v. Ross, No. 02AP-898, 2003
WL 21470091, *8 (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 2003) ("Although Dr. Norton eventually
acknowledged that he could not say with reasonable medical certainty that the blow
occurred less than two hours before the death, he asserted that such a time frame was
'probably' involved and made the concession about 'probably' only on crossexamination after stating with greater assurance on direct examination that only minutes
passed between the blow and the baby's death."); State v. Hanson, No. E2006-00883CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 2416103, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 27, 2007) ("Dr. Morris
opined that to a reasonable medical certainty S.H. had been abused. However, Dr.
Morris acknowledged that his medical definition of child abuse included passive neglect
that causes injury to a child. Dr. Morris also explained that 'reasonable medical certainty'
meant that it was 'more probable than not."'), rev'd, 279 S.W.3d 265, 278 (Tenn. 2009)
(holding there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction); State v. Redford, No.
25350-0-11, 2001 WL 13280, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2001) ("But Hanna-Truscott
could not say with reasonable medical certainty that abuse had occurred. Nonetheless,
the physical findings, coupled with A.R.'s verbal disclosure of abuse, led HannaTruscott to conclude that there had been 'probable sexual abuse."').
74. Furtado v. State, No. 08-00-00230-CR, 2001 WL 959437, at *3, *8 (Tex. App.
Aug. 23,2001) ("Although three of the six bite marks were of insufficient quality to make
a determination, he found, to a reasonable medical certainty, that Appellant had made
one of the bites and his teeth were consistent with two of the remaining
injuries.... Further, the bite mark evidence excluded Sanders as the source of the bite
marks while showing beyond a reasonable medical certainty that at least one of the bite
marks matched Appellant's teeth." (emphasis added)).
75. State v. Duncan, 802 So. 2d 533, 541 (La. 2001) ("Dr. Riesner, testified with
varying degrees of certainty that wounds found on the victim's cheek, neck and elbow
were caused by defendant's teeth.... Dr. Kirschner, also testified 'to a reasonable
medical certainty' that the injuries were not bite marks.").
76. United States v. Eagle, 515 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2008) (describing the
defendant's request to exclude the expert physician's testimony or to hold a hearing to
determine whether the medical conclusions were qualified with reasonable medical
certainty); In re C.M., 678 S.E.2d 794, 798 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) ("Respondent-father
specifically contends that there was no clear and convincing evidence to determine
whether Alexander's brain injury was caused by accidental or non-accidental means,
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require the use of RMC to prove causation, and a few other courts explicitly
77
declined the use of any particular phrase.
What did begin to emerge, however, were lengthier discussions on
RMC and its significance in different types of cases. For example, in State v.
Muro, the defendant appealed her conviction for child abuse resulting in the
death of her child, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove causation of
the child's death with reasonable medical certainty. 78 The prosecution
presented expert opinions from two physicians to prove the element of
causation, and the appellate court quoted that testimony at length. 79 The first
physician, Dr. Alexander, explained that "the 4-hour period from the onset
of symptoms to the time when Vivianna was taken to Tri-County Hospital
at approximately 11 p.m. was a long time for a child to survive a head injury
and was not typical."8 0 He further explained "that he was unable to put a
percentage on the number of children who would survive having gone 4
hours between severe head trauma and receiving medical attention, because
'nobody's done that experiment and nobody would do such an
experiment.'" 8 He did, however, explain that if 100 children suffered severe
injuries, survived for approximately four hours, and died soon after receiving
medical attention, then the situation suggests that the injuries were not fatal
none of the doctors testified with 'reasonable medical certainty' whether the cause was
accidental or non-accidental, and doctors could not say with 'reasonable medical
certainty' the specific mechanism or exact time that the brain injury occurred."); Marin
v. State, No. 01-08-00517, 2009 WL 2526434, at *8 (Tex. App. Aug. 20, 2009) ("Main
attacks the testimony of the State's expert witnesses, arguing that none of the medical
experts expressed their opinions in terms of reasonable medical certainty."); State v.
Dailey, No. 26131-6-II, 2002 WL 339417, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2002) ("Dailey
argues that the trial court erred by admitting this testimony first because the laceration
was irrelevant, and second because [director of Sexual Assault Nurse Examination
program] could not say with reasonable medical certainty that the laceration was caused
by anal intercourse with him.").
77. See, e.g., Richardson v. State, 794 N.E.2d 506, 513 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) ("[T]he
issue in Strong is whether there is a 'threshold level of certainty or
conclusiveness.., required in an expert's opinion as a prerequisite to its
admissibility.'.. . The court held that there is no threshold level of certainty, and it
restated the well-settled rule that a jury is always 'free either to accept or reject the
opinion of the expert witness.. . ."' (quoting Strong v. State, 538 N.E.2d 924, 931 (Ind.
1989))).
78. State v. Muro, 688 N.W.2d 148, 151,157 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004), affd in partand
vacated in part, 695 N.W.2d 425 (Neb. 2005).
79. Id. at 158-59.
80. Id. at 159.
81. Id.
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and the child could have survived if the child received medical treatment
earlier.8 2 The second physician, Dr. Parys, testified to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty that the child would have had a chance of survival. 83
Addressing the issue of causation, the majority in the court stated the
following:
[W]e reject the argument that the State had the burden to show by a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that Vivianna's chances of
survival had [the defendant] sought medical care sooner were "more
likely than not" or some other bright-line percentage....
There is no case in Nebraska establishing that in cases such as this,
the State must prove that the child's chances of survival were higher
than an arbitrary predetermined percentage. Aside from the lack of
precedent on this issue, we think using such a preestablished bright-line
rule would fail to account for the particular factual nuances that are
present in cases such as these. We are at a loss as to where such a bright
line should be set and what the justification for such a particular line
would be; why might a 50-percent chance of survival be sufficient, but a
49-percent not sufficient, for example?84
The dissenting judge argued that the standard for "medical proof" is
probability, not mere possibility.85 He then emphasized that "while the
medical testimony need not be couched in magic words such as reasonable
medical certainty or reasonable probability, it must be 'sufficient as
examined in its entirety to establish the crucial causal link."' 6 He concluded
his argument by stating that medical opinions "must rise to the level of,
'8 7
probability, or of 'more likely than not' or 'reasonable medical certainty.'
The Supreme Court of Nebraska agreed with the dissenting opinion, vacated
the defendant's 20-year sentence, and remanded the case for appropriate
sentencing. 88 A California court reached a similar conclusion that reasonable
medical certainty is equivalent to a finding that a conclusion is more
probable than not when stating,
82. Id.
83. Id.

84. Id. at 160.
85. Id. at 164.
86. Id. at 165 (internal citations omitted) (quoting People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353,
357 n.2 (Cal. 1966)).
87. Id.
88. State v. Muro, 695 N.W.2d 425,432 (Neb. 2005).
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The fact that Dr. Weinraub only reached his conclusion "on more
probable than not basis" did not detract from its evidentiary value. "To
hold that medical opinion fails as a matter of law to sustain a jury in
reaching a conviction 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' because the
testimony rests upon 'reasonable medical certainty,' would in substance
foreclose the realistic use of medical testimony at criminal trials." 89
In 2007, the Supreme Court of Nebraska reiterated its standard,
providing insight into the jurisdiction's definition of RMC once again.90 In
State v. Kuehn, the defendant argued the expert testimony was not
admissible because the physician failed to use the phrase to qualify the
medical conclusions. 91 The majority in the court emphasized that while the
preferred form when qualifying expert physicians' opinions is to use the
phrase, RMC is not necessary so long as the testimony establishes a causal
link. 92 The defendant in United States v. Two Elk argued that the expert
testimony must be established to a reasonable medical certainty. 93 The court
rejected the contention, explaining that the Larson rule of testimony
reliability, derived from Federal Rule of Evidence 702, applied to the federal
94
case; because the testimony was reliable, it was admissible.
That same year, in People v. Ramirez, the Supreme Court of Colorado
took an unprecedented approach, explicitly rejecting the need for the phrase
as a standard to admit expert physician testimony and providing a lengthy
discussion on the phrase. 95 In Ramirez, the defendant was convicted of sexual
assault on a child.9 6 The conviction was based in part on the testimony of an
expert nurse, Ms. Burns, who testified for the prosecution. 97 After the
prosecution offered Burns as an expert, the defense proceeded to question
her qualifications as an expert and the certainty of her medical conclusions. 98
What follows is the exchange between the defense and Burns:

89.
2006).
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

People v. Rowe, No. E038356, 2006 WL 2349633, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 15,
State v. Kuehn, 728 N.W.2d 589, 597-98 (Neb. 2007).
Id. at 597.
Id. at 597-98.
United States v. Two Elk, 536 F.3d 890, 904 (8th Cir. 2008).
Id.
People v. Ramirez, 155 P.3d 371, 372-73 (Colo. 2007) (en banc).
Id. at 374.
Id.
Id. at 373.
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At one point, defense counsel asked Bums if she had been able to reach
any conclusion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. After asking
for further clarification, Bums replied that her findings "are suspicious,
but not diagnostic." Defense counsel stated, "And so you have not
reached a conclusion to a reasonabledegree of medical certainty in this
case, have you?", and Bums answered, "Correct." Following his
questioning of Bums, defense counsel objected to Bums' testimony on
the grounds that she was not qualified to render an expert opinion, and
that.., her testimony would not be helpful to the jury because it would
not be to a reasonabledegree of medical certainty.99
The trial court allowed her testimony, stating the medical exam
revealed "suspicious" results, meaning the results "'rais[ed her] index of
suspicion' and is a finding that may well have been caused by sexual abuse
but could have been caused by something else."' 10 The defense again
objected to the testimony arguing that the testimony was speculative.10 1 The
trial court allowed the testimony to move forward, and the jury found the
defendant guilty. 102 The appellate court reversed the conviction, implicitly
reasoning that Burns' testimony was not admissible because the testimony
was not stated with reasonable medical probability.10 3 The state supreme
court reversed the appellate court's decision, explaining that requiring the
use of the phrase was an antiquated requirement that predated the Colorado
Rules of Evidence (CRE) and wrongly placed emphasis on sufficiency of
evidence rather than admissibility of physicians' expert testimony. 10 4 The
Supreme Court of Colorado proceeded to explain in detail the multi-prong
test for admitting expert testimony and found the testimony admissible
10 5
because it was reliable and met the prongs.
The use of RMC in child abuse cases continued to rise in the 2000s,
with most courts using the phrase in passing as in prior decades. However,
courts in this decade have increasingly chosen to elaborate on issues arising
from the use of the phrase. Generally, most of the cases in this decade

99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 373-74.
101. Id. at 374.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 375.
104. Id. at 375, 382.
105. Id. at 378-80. The multi-prong test states that the testimony must be relevant
under CRE 401 and 402, reliable and relevant under CRE 702, and not substantially
outweighed by concerns (e.g., prejudice) detailed under CRE 403. Id. at 378.
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continue to use the phrase in passing, implicitly promoting its need and
signaling its importance but offering no further analysis, a practice largely
unchanged from prior decades. 10 6 Expert witnesses, parties, and courts also
106. Phillips v. Bradshaw, 607 F.3d 199, 220 (6th Cir. 2010) ("Dr. Cox, who
performed the autopsy on Sheila's body, testified that on the day of her death she
suffered numerous internal and external injuries from multiple blows, and that, based on
a reasonable medical certainty, these blows caused Sheila's death."); Hebert v. Rogers,
No. 15-4950, 2016 WL 8291110, at *5 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 2016) ("In [the psychiatry
expert's] opinion, with reasonable medical certainty, due to severe psychotic depression,
distorted mind, delusions, and hallucinations, the defendant could not distinguish
whether stabbing her children was right or wrong because she believed it was in their
best interests."); Grose v. Streeter, No. 3:12CV46-MPM-DAS, 2016 WL 4996530, at *6
(N.D. Miss. Sept. 19, 2016) ("[The pediatrician] also testified that to a reasonable
medical certainty, her opinion was that the bruising inside the labia majora was caused
by 'penetration by an object, whether it be, you know, a penis or whatever." (internal
citation omitted)); Riley v. Medeiros, No. 14-cv-14401, 2016 WL 4408984, at *9 (D. Mass.
Aug. 16, 2016) ("Accordingly, he testified 'with reasonable medical certainty.., that
Clonidine, although elevated, did not cause [Rebecca's] death or contribute to her
death,' and that pneumonia had caused her death." (alteration in original) (internal
citation omitted)); Leonard v. Oregon, No. 2:13-cv-01865-ST, 2016 WL 1172114, at *1
(D. Or. Feb. 8, 2016) ("Dr. Chervenak concluded 'to a reasonable medical certainty' that
JR had been sexually abused, and was concerned that she had been physically abused as
well."); United States v. White, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1041 (D. Minn. 2014) ("'So, [the
abused child] has a form of head trauma or head injury which,' in his opinion to a
,reasonable medical certainty ...is an example of blunt impact injury."'), rev'd and
remanded,794 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 2015); Staruh v. Winstead, No. 3:11-CV-1604, 2012 WL
1144655, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2012) ("In opposition to [the petitioner's] testimony,
the pathologist declared with reasonable medical certainty that J.J.'s injuries were not
consistent with a two-foot fall from a stool, claiming such an accident would not cause
fatal brain injury." (alteration in original)); Moore v. Newton-Embry, No. CIV-09-985C, 2011 WL 5143080, at *9 n.97 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 7, 2011) ("[The doctor] was asked:
'And you feel comfortable with that within a reasonable medical certainty that we're
talking rapidly within minutes?"'); People v. Vaughn, No. B272301, 2017 WL 2289986,
at *2, *4 (Cal. Ct. App. May 25, 2017) ("It was not possible for [the doctor] to say, to a
medical certainty, how many blows were inflicted.... [The defendant's] version of the
events fits the facts of the case with 'reasonable medical certainty."'); L.H. v. C.H., No.
C075666, 2015 WL 9005772, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2015) ("Dr. Rosas opined to a
reasonable medical certainty that child abuse caused the injuries."); People v. Ackles,
No. D060772, 2012 WL 3900676, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2012) ("To a reasonable
medical certainty, [the board certified emergency physician]'s opinion was this was an
accident."); Angelina B. v. Superior Court of Tulare Cty., No. F062782, 2011 WL
4433091, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2011) ("Under questioning by county counsel, Dr.
Hyden opined to a reasonable medical certainty that S. was injured between the time she
was discharged on the morning of December 15, 2010, from children's hospital and the
time she was readmitted there later that evening."); Darryl J.v. Superior Court of Tulare
Cty., No. F062788, 2011 WL 4433093, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2011) ("During his
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testimony, Dr. Hyden first opined to a reasonable medical certainty the injury occurred
on December 15, 2010, between the child's discharge at 1:30 a.m. and her readmission
that same date.... Dr. Hyden, after being given a hypothetical that Dr. Sanchez
observed left-sided weakening, opined to a reasonable medical certainty that if that were
the case, the injury most likely occurred prior to Dr. Sanchez seeing the child."); People
v. Uribe, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 102, 109 (Ct. App. 2011) ("A defense expert, Dr. Theodore
Hariton, a retired obstetrician and gynecologist, opined, based upon records and
photographs from the SART exam, that 'with reasonable medical certainty this
[penetrating trauma] did not happen."' (alteration in original)); Joseph V. v. Samuel V.,
No. B218035, 2010 WL 968107, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2010) ("Dr. Imagawa held
this opinion to a reasonable medical certainty, and could not perceive any other
reasonable medical explanation for Joseph's history."); In re R.K., NO. CAAP-140001091, 2016 WL 6779484, at *5 (Haw. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2016) ("Dr. French's opinions
as expressed in two reports, as well as her trial testimony, were made to a reasonable
medical certainty."); Albers v. Broam, No. 10-0594, 2010 WL 3894478, at *1 (Iowa Ct.
App. Oct. 6, 2010) ("The regional director of the Child Protection Center labeled it as a
nonaccidental injury caused by the carelessness of Brandon; that it is a reasonable
medical certainty that a spiral fracture to an infant is a result of a forceful twisting
motion."); Alger v. State, No. 102,453, 2011 WL 767886, at *2 (Kan. Ct. App. Feb. 25,
2011) ("For these reasons, Pojman testified, 'with reasonable medical certainty,' that,
Alexis' injury occurred during the 20 to 30 minutes between the time Alger had dropped
Sobely off at work and the time emergency medical services were dispatched to the
home. Melhorn was able to state, 'with reasonable medical certainty,' that Alexis' injury
occurred within that timeframe."); State v. Thomas, No. 2013 KA 0279, 2013 WL
5915193, at *2 (La. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2013) ("Dr. Zeretske also testified, without
objection, that a CT scan of the victim's head showed chronic subdural effusions, as well
as fresh blood at the tentorium along the midline falx, and a left-sided parietal skull
fracture."); Barber v. State, 153 A.3d 800, 807-17 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017)
(continuously quoting the expert medical opinions where the phrase was used);
Commonwealth v. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d 672, 680 (Mass. 2012) ("Callery, the defendant's
medical expert, testified that he could not state 'to a degree of reasonable medical
certainty' whether the baby was born alive."); People v. Chevis, No. 304358, 2013 WL
5539279, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2013) ("[T]here was nothing improper regarding
the prosecutor's question whether Dr. Simms had 'an opinion based on reasonable
medical certainty as to whether or not [the] physical examination and medical history
[were] consistent with [the] allegation of sexual abuse."' (second, third, and fourth
alteration in original)); State v. Beecroft, 813 N.W.2d 814, 856 (Minn. 2012) ("Dr.
Ophoven also provided a written report to Dr. Roe in which Dr. Ophoven concluded
that there was no evidence, to a reasonable medical certainty, that Beecroft's baby was
born alive."); State v. Herrera, 856 N.W.2d 310, 326 (Neb. 2014) ("[A geneticist and
pediatrician] testified that he reached his diagnosis of PSS with reasonable medical
certainty."); Collman v. Warden of Nev. State Prison, No. HC-0105006, 2014 Nev. Dist.
LEXIS 215, at *38 (Dist. Ct. Nev. Mar. 28, 2014) ("Damian did not suffer an acute
subdural hematoma. Dr. Plunkett agreed that Damian was an abused child and that he
could not with any reasonable medical certainty testify that Damian died of a fall down
the stairs."); State v. D.M., No. A-1050-07T4, 2010 WL 2868503, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. July 21, 2010) ("Dr. Finkel opined, within a reasonable medical certainty, that
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D.L. experienced trauma to the structures of the vaginal vestibule."); Jackson v. Franke,
392 P.3d 328, 336 (Or. Ct. App. 2017) ("Is the uncritical faith that factfinders place in a
doctor's diagnosis that is within a 'reasonable medical certainty' unfairly prejudicial
when balanced against the limited scientific validity of a diagnosis that is based on the
examiner's subjective belief that the child is telling the truth?"); State v. Cox, 273 P.3d
299, 301 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) ("Despite a lack of physical findings indicating that K had
been abused, [the medical examiner] nonetheless diagnosed 'with reasonable medical
certainty that [K] had been the victim of child sexual abuse' based on K's history and the
disclosures that K had made to a forensic child interviewer about the abuse." (second
alteration in original)); State v. Clay, 230 P.3d 72, 74 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) ("[A pediatric
nurse practicition] then testified that, to a reasonable medical certainty, she had
diagnosed J. as having been sexually abused."); State v. Robat, 49 A.3d 58, 68 (R.I. 2012)
("Doctor Arden added that, given the evidence that the baby had taken only 'but [a] few
breaths,' he could not 'arrive at the opinion that providing neonatal care would have, to
a reasonable medical certainty, altered the outcome."' (alteration in original)); In re
A.A.T., No. 04-16-00344-CV, 2016 WL 7448370, at *6 (Tex. App. Dec. 28, 2016) ("[The
testifying pediatric geneticist and pediatrician] was unable to say with reasonable
medical certainty that Mother or J.G. had a Vitamin D deficiency."); Ex parteMayhugh,
512 S.W.3d 285,320 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (Alcala, J., concurring) ("[The doctor] states
that, based on that new understanding, and specifically in light of the study published in
2007, it is now her expert medical opinion that she 'cannot determine with reasonable
medical certainty whether [V.L.'s] hymen had ever been injured at the time of the 1994
examination."' (alteration in original)); Ex parte Overton, 444 S.W.3d 632, 639 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2014) (noting that a leading expert on hypernatremia was asked: "Do you
have an opinion based on reasonable medical certainty and your education, your
experience in this field as someone who has studied dozens of hypernatremia cases even
since the trial of this case, do you have an opinion whether or not with a sodium level of
245 he could have saved even in the best of care, even if that 9-1-1 call had been made
immediately, the ambulance had come immediately, and they'd taken him in and gave
him the very, very best of care?"); In re A.G.G., No. 13-11-00299-CV, 2013 WL 53756,
at *8 (Tex. App. Jan. 3, 2013) ("Drs. Tinoco and Harper described I.V.'s physical
appearance at the time of his hospitalization as 'wasted' and likened his appearance to
victims of the Nazi concentration camps of World War II. Dr. Tinoco also testified with
reasonable medical certainty that I.V. was within moments of death, given that I.V.'s
glucose level was at 3, and a medically normal level is between 60 and 110."); Pierson v.
State, 398 S.W.3d 406, 422 (Tex. App. 2013) ("When asked whether he believed, 'based
on reasonable medical certainty,' that vaginal or anal sexual activity had occurred
immediately before the examination, Dr. Jacobson replied that there did not appear to
be."); In re E.S., No. 13-10-00100-CV, 2010 WL 5401409, at *14 (Tex. App. Dec. 21, 2010)
("Dr. Harper agreed that based on reasonable medical certainty, E.S.'s injuries were
non-accidental."); State v. Trebilcock, 341 P.3d 1004, 1007 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014)
("Based on Dr. Valvano's review of J.T.'s records, his examination of J.T., and J.T.'s
progress and improvement at the hospital, Dr. Valvano opined to a reasonable medical
certainty that improper exposure to cold weather caused J.T.'s hypothermic state and
that not being given enough food to eat caused J.T.'s malnourishment."); State v. Wilson,
No. 41990-4-I1, 2013 WL 1335162, at 9148 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2013) (arguing the
meaning of the phrase "most consistent" and the word "deep" but not the phrase
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continued to provide their own definition or to offer insight into their
conceptual understanding of the phrase, sometimes differentiating RMC
from other standards. 1 7 Some courts continued to require the phrase to
prove causation, while others expected experts to use a phrase such as RMC
"reasonable medical certainty"); State v. Venegas, 228 P.3d 813, 819-20 (Wash. Ct. App.
2010) (referencing continuously that the expert physician testified to a reasonable
medical certainty as to causation but never explaining the meaning of the phrase).
107. See, e.g., McLain v. Blacketter, No. 3:08-cv-01440-KI, 2012 WL 3116186, at *5
(D. Or. July 27, 2012) ("Q. And that conclusion is reached to a reasonable medical

certainty? A. Yes. Q. A person might say, well, how can you make a reasonable medical
certainty conclusion when what information you have basically is that which is provided
to you by the child during the course of the examination... ? A. Well, reasonable
medical certainty means that given an examiner with similar experience, education, and
training, they would reach the same conclusion if they had the same information.");
People v. Luevano, No. F065562, 2014 WL 3555469, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. July 18, 2014)
("Defendant claims the court was required to sua sponte 'modify CALCRIM No. 220 to
inform the jury that the phrase "to a reasonable medical certainty["] was not the same
as ["]beyond a reasonable doubt" "because [']the jury likely believed... ["to a]
reasonable medical certainty["] equaled ["]beyond a reasonable doubt["]['] and,
'[w]ithout this clarification, the jury could not understand the import of Dr. Hyden's
opinion on the ultimate issues in this case."'); Nyla W. v. Nora A., No. NA-11077/12,
2013 WL 3069661, at *11 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. Apr. 4, 2013) ("The expert's opinion or
conclusion must be based upon a reasonable degree of certainty, not on supposition or
speculation or mere possibility."); In re Te.R., No. L-15-1015, 2015 WL 9589733, at *4
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2015) (citation omitted) ("'In Ohio, the admissibility of expert
testimony that an event is the proximate cause is contingent upon the expression of an
opinion by the expert with respect to the causative event in terms of
probability.'.... '[A]n event is probable if there is a greater than fifty percent likelihood
that it produced the occurrence at issue.. . .' The fact that Dr. Schlievert did not use the
specific phrase 'reasonable degree of medical certainty' is inconsequential." (alteration
in original) (quoting Stinson v. England, 633 N.E.2d 532, 537 (Ohio 1994))); Dep't of
Human Servs. v. H.L.R., 260 P.3d 787, 795 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) ("When asked whether
his predictions of future effects of mother's diagnosis on her parenting were 'made to a
reasonable medical certainty,' [the psychologist evaluator] noted that he could not 'say
for certain that future events will take place' and that 'reasonable medical sufficiency'
relates typically to 'a current diagnosis, current condition, current functioning' and not
to 'predictions related to the future, which is inherently difficult to do."');
Commonwealth v. Martin, 101 A.3d 706,715 (Pa. 2014) ("Although he could not exclude
the possibility that the injury inside G.B.'s vagina could have been caused by some other
type of blunt object, such as a finger or rounded pen, Dr. Wecht opined 'with reasonable
medical certainty, not absolute certainty but with reasonable medical certainty, that the
most likely instrumentality or object that would have produced [the] injury would have
been a penis,' based on the coinciding evidence that G.B.'s pants and panties had been
pulled down and that she had died by manual strangulation." (alteration in original)
(citation omitted)).
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to establish the necessary degree of certainty of the expert testimony. 108 For
example, in Galloway v. State, the defendant argued the expert testimony
was insufficient to support the conviction because the expert physician did
not qualify the medical conclusion-that the child suffered anal
penetration-with the RMC phrase. 109 The court proceeded to provide a
detailed explanation of the use of the phrase.'10 The court explained the use
of RMC gave probative value to the expert's testimony, helping establish the
weight, though not the admissibility, of the medical opinion.11 1 Quoting at
length from Schulz v. Celotex Corp., the court explained the applicable legal
principles as follows:
... [T]he phrase "with a reasonable degree of medical certainty" is a

useful shorthand expression that is helpful in forestalling challenges to
108. See, e.g., State v. Gallaway, No. 1012003724 (R-1), 2015 WL 4460992, at *6(Del.
Super. Ct. July 16, 2015) ("'[A] doctor's testimony can only be considered evidence when
his conclusions are based on reasonable medical certainty that a fact is true or untrue.'
In order to be admissible and considered, every medical opinion must be offered to a
reasonable medical probability or reasonable certainty." (alteration in original) (quoting
Oxendine v. State, 528 A.2d 870, 873 (Del. 1987)); Alvarez-Madrigal v. State, 71 N.E.3d
887, 891 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) ("Alvarez-Madrigal then objected, stating, 'This clearly
calls for speculation. It's not relevant to the facts of the case.' .. . The State responded,
'She's a child abuse expert. She has talked about her evaluation of psychological and
emotional mental health. It's part of her job to know statistics.' . .. The trial court did
not expressly rule on the objection, but stated, 'Then ask her this, ask every question in
terms of reasonable medical certainty."' (citations omitted)); Williams v. State, 35 So. 3d
480, 486 (Miss. 2010) ("'[B]efore a qualified expert's opinion may be received, it must
rise above mere speculation.' ... '[O]nly opinions formed by medical experts upon the
basis of credible evidence in the case and which can be stated within reasonable medical
certainty have probative value.' ... Although an expert need not use the exact phrase,
'reasonable degree of medical certainty,' this does not diminish the requirements for
admissibility." (alterations in original) (first quoting Goforth v. City of Ridgeland, 603
So. 2d 323, 329 (Miss. 1992), then quoting Catchings v. State, 684 So. 2d 591, 596 (Miss.
1996))); G.H. v. Mental Health Bd. of the Fourth Judicial Dist., 781 N.W.2d 438, 445
(Neb. 2010) ("In that context, we have held that although expert medical testimony need
not be couched in the magic words 'reasonable medical certainty' or 'reasonable
probability,' it must be sufficient as examined in its entirety to establish the crucial causal
link between the plaintiff's injuries and the defendant's negligence."); State v. Consaul,
332 P.3d 850, 865 (N.M. 2014) ("Unlike the present case, doctors usually testify as to
what caused a patient's condition using phrases like 'to a reasonable medical probability'
or 'to a reasonable medical certainty,' phrases that demonstrate a sufficient degree of
conviction to be probative." (citation omitted)).
109. Galloway v. State, 122 So. 3d 614, 664-65 (Miss. 2013).
110. Id. at 665.

111. Id. at 666.
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the admissibility of expert testimony. Care must be taken, however, to
see that the incantation does not become a semantic trap and the failure
to voice it is not used as a basis for exclusion without analysis of the
testimony itself.... Situations in which the failure to qualify the opinion
have resulted in exclusion are typically those in which the expert
testimony is speculative, using such language as "possibility." ...
Phrases like "strong possibility," or "20-80% probability," also invite
speculation....
Accordingly, while the particular phrase used should not be
dispositive, it may indicate the level of confidence the expert has in the
expressed opinion. Perhaps nothing is absolutely certain in the field of
medicine, but the intent of the law is that if a physician cannot form an
opinion with sufficient certainty so as to make a medical judgment,
112
neither can a jury use that information to reach a decision.
While the court is representative of the approach of its home state, the
rationale presented may be more generalizable: the phrase attaches a form
of weight to the expert's testimony and allows the fact finder to reach a
11 3
verdict based on the weight.
Alleged child abuse offenders in the current decade continue to
challenge expert physician testimony as insufficient when the expert fails to
qualify the medical opinions to a reasonable medical certainty-with many
courts countering this claim.1 14 For example, the court in State v. Merrill
112. Id. at 666-67 (citations omitted) (quoting Schulz v. Celotex Corp., 942 F.2d 204,
208 (3d Cir. 1991)).
113. Id.; see also Consaul, 332 P.3d at 865 ("[P]hrases like 'to a reasonable medical
probability' or 'to a reasonable medical certainty'.... These phrases 'are also terms of
art in the law that have no analog for a practicing physician.' ... Essentially, these
phrases satisfy a minimal standard of probability, and therefore admissibility, that an
opinion is more likely than not true." (citations omitted)).
114. See, e.g., State ex reL Montgomery v. Whitten, 262 P.3d 238, 243 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2011) ("[District Medical Group] also raises concerns about pretrial interview questions
focusing on causation, stating: In regard to causation, the prosecutor asked Dr. Connell
'what type of circumstances would you see similar fractures from?' The defendant's
counsel asked Dr. Gridley, 'are there any conclusions that you can draw to a reasonable
medical certainty based on these records as to the cause of the these injuries?' The State
followed up, asking Dr. Gridley, 'would you be able to indicate whether or not the cause
of that was from trauma?' Dr. Rosenberg was asked the same questions. Dr. Lezine was
asked about the possibility that the injuries were 'caused' by a short fall of[f] a bed and
what literature supported her answer." (second alteration in original)); Denise M. v.
Burnett, No. A142006, 2015 WL 6787055, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2015) ("Defendant
finally challenges the therapists' declarations on the ground they fail to state their
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provided a lengthy discussion about why RMC is not needed in response to
the defendant's claim for sufficiency of evidence."1 ' The defendant in Merrill
then appealed, arguing that the district court erred in admitting the expert
physician's testimony because the expert failed to qualify the medical
conclusions in court with a "reasonable medical certainty," the alleged legal
standard." 6 However, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected this argument,
explaining that the Utah Supreme Court had allowed expert testimony in
other cases even when the physician was unable to qualify the medical
conclusions with the phrase, and stating that questions of uncertainties are
for the fact finder to resolve." 7 Second, the court reasoned that in criminal
cases, the phrase RMC is not required.118 Instead, experts may qualify their
medical conclusions with "probability, possibility, or likelihood," so long as
the testimony represents the expert's "best judgment to a reasonable
certainty.""' 9 And because the expert in Merrill's case based his medical
conclusions on his best judgment, the testimony did not require the use of
the phrase. 2 A court of criminal appeals in Tennessee provided a similar
response to a defendant's argument that the expert was required to testify
using RMC.121 The court explained, "Although in criminal cases, experts
have often testified to the cause of injuries or other conditions 'to a
opinions are to a reasonable medical certainty.... However, [precedent] does not
provide the expert's testimony must use the words 'reasonable medical probability,'
instead, it provides the evidence must prove the identified fact within a reasonable
medical probability." (citations omitted)); Desormeaux v. State, 362 S.W.3d 233, 239
(Tex. App. 2012) ("Appellant cites no criminal case requiring that the testimony
regarding cause of death include the phrase 'reasonable medical certainty,' and he did
not object to the testimony on this basis at trial.... Issues four and five are overruled.");
In re Commitment of B. Brady, No. 09-09-00360-CV, 2011 WL 2420862, at *6 n.4 (Tex.
App. June 16, 2011) ("Brady complains that Dr. Dunham failed to 'quantify' the phrase
"'high" risk' and Dr. Arambula based his opinion on a 'reasonable medical probability'
instead of a 'reasonable medical certainty.' Brady cites no authority for these
arguments.... Assuming without deciding that quantification is necessary, the record
contains other evidence regarding the recidivism rate for offenders in the 'high' range
category. Moreover, Dr. Arambula's use of the 'reasonable medical probability'
standard merely goes to the weight of his testimony." (citations omitted)).
115. State v. Merrill, 269 P.3d 196, 201-02 (Utah Ct. App. 2012).
116. Id. at 201.
117. Id. at 201-02.
118. Id. at 201.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 202.
121. State v. Greenwood, No. M2013-01924-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 6609308, at *3334 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 21, 2014).
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reasonable degree of medical certainty,' Tennessee law requires neither
these nor 'any other specific words be recited' as a condition precedent for
admissibility of an expert opinion." '
Analyses such as the one offered in Merrill leave some issues
unresolved. For example, in Merrill, the reader learns from the court that
reasonable medical certainty is understood as having greater certainty than
mere probability, possibility, or likelihood. 123 However, the court does not
define what medical certainty is, either numerically or using another
standard. 124 The court also explains the standard for expert physician
testimony is that the testimony be based on the expert's best judgment to a
reasonable certainty. 125 However, the court does not explain how reasonable
certainty differs from reasonable medical certainty. 2 6 Moreover, when the
court applies the purported standard, the court focuses on the best judgment
portion and does not address the reasonable certainty portion at all. 12 7 From
the discussion, the reader may conclude that the court endorsed a standard
under which the expert's testimony is valid so long as the testimony reflects
the expert's best judgment, without requiring an explicit degree of
128
certainty.
This survey of the use of RMC in child abuse cases throughout the
decades illustrates the lack of coherence in the use of this phrase and the
need for further clarification in the fields of medicine and the law. The
majority of the cases leave the phrase undefined or unaddressed while
signaling its importance through its continued use and emphasis through
quotation marks or italics. 129 Understandably, this lack of consensus
conduces different parties in the legal proceeding to use and interpret RMC
according to their own subjective understanding of the phrase.
Imagine, for example, a state's attorney asking an expert physician,
"Doctor, can you state with a reasonable medical certainty that the child's
injuries resulting in the death of the child are non-accidental?" The judge
122. Id. at *33 (citing State v. Young, No. 01CO1-9605-CC-00208, 1998 WL 258466,

at *22 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 22, 1998)).
123. See Merrill, 269 P.3d at 201.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 201-02.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Lingle, 27 M.J. 704, 706 (A.F.C.M.R. 1988); People v.
Ewing, 140 Cal. Rptr. 299, 300 (Ct. App. 1977).
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may understand the question as asking the physician whether the physician
can assert this conclusion using his or her best professional judgment, while
the physician may interpret the question as asking if he or she can assert with
certainty that the injuries were intentional; and yet the state's attorney may
actually be asking whether the physician can assert that it is more likely than
not that the evidence supports the conclusion. 130 Others in the courtroom,
including the opposing counsel and the jury, may conceptualize the question
as asking whether the physician can draw the conclusion with at least a 95
percent confidence level. 31 And, still others may wonder how reasonable
medical certainty is related to true certainty. Each of these interpretations is
understandable, and the issues at stake in child abuse cases are formidable,
therefore clarification of RMC is a pressing issue.
Moreover, any response clarifying the definition must be broadly
applicable. Expert physicians are not bound to testify in particular
jurisdictions, but instead share their expertise across the country. 132 So even
if individual jurisdictions reach consensus within their separate domains, it
will not be sufficient for cases where multiple experts with multiple
understandings of the phrase testify in the same proceeding. Equally, if not
more problematic, is that having different definitions across jurisdictions
could mean that a defendant could be found guilty of child abuse and lose
custody of a child in one jurisdiction but not in another simply because of
the locale-a risk that could be avoided by developing cross-jurisdictional
consensus regarding RMC.1 33
C. A NationalSurvey of Medical Professionals
Having experienced inconsistency in the interpretation of RMC in
court cases involving child abuse, a group of physicians and attorneys
(including the Authors) were motivated to move beyond anecdotal
frustration to a comprehensive analysis of the meaning and application of
RMC.134 As a first step, in 2015, Dias and Levi expanded prior work on the
130. Dias et al., supra note 14, at 224.
131. Id. at 225.
132. See, e.g., Alice R. Berkowitz; Introduction, JURISPRO EXPERT WITNESS
DIRECTORY, https://www.jurispro.com/expert/alice-berkowitz-995 (last visited July 13,
2017) (describing the increase in costs when she has to travel out of town or out of the

country to testify at trials).
133. Paul C. Giannelli, "Reasonable Scientific Certainty": A Phrase in Search of a
Meaning, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2010, at 40, 41.
134. See generally Dias et al., supra note 14.
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concept of reasonable medical certainty, surveying physicians.135 This survey
recruited child abuse pediatricians, forensic pathologists, pediatric
136
neurosurgeons, and pediatric ophthalmologists from across the country, of
whom 95 percent (279 out of 294) had served as expert witnesses in child
abuse cases.1 37 Though the data showed clustered responses around some
proposed definitions of RMC and revealed 95 percent internal consistency
in individual respondent's responses, the data showed significant variability
in the definition of RMC across both individuals and the medical
specialties. 3 ' The data also revealed that almost 30 percent of respondents
used different interpretations of RMC depending on whether the case in
which they were testifying involved criminal charges, as opposed to civil
charges. 139 These results emphasize not only the lack of consensus regarding
how medical experts interpret RMC, but also the importance of addressing
40
this issue.
III. SURVEY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA LEGAL COMMUNITY
Perplexed and intrigued by the results of the first study surveying
physicians, the Authors were interested in learning how legal professionals
conceptualize RMC, so they conducted an analogous survey of attorneys and
judges in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The results revealed what the
cases suggest and the prior survey of physicians supports: RMC has become
an incantation without meaning, which leaves parties in legal proceedings to
attach subjective meanings when using the phrase.141 RMC's meaning can
vary even within the same jurisdiction, and hence supports the need for risk142
reduction mechanisms.

A. Methods
This three-section survey was comprised of similar questions as the
143
prior physician survey but included modifications for the legal community.
The first section surveyed respondents' understanding of RMC based on (a)
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See id. at 219.
Id.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 220-22.
Id. at 222.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.B.

142. See infra Part III.B.
143. See infra Part III.B.
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prior training; (b) the respondents' normative views of the phrase; and (c)
expected probability that child abuse occurred when an expert testifies that
child abuse occurred to a reasonable medical certainty (i.e., most likely
explanation, second most likely explanation, third most likely explanation,
fourth most likely explanation, and fifth most likely explanation). 144 The
survey also asked the respondents to specify whether and how their
interpretations of the phrase varied depending on the type of case (family
law versus criminal law) and the severity of the charges (murder versus
assault/battery). 145 The second section presented respondents with five court
hypotheticals with varying levels of ambiguity and complexity in which a
hypothetical expert witness testified that abuse occurred to a reasonable
medical certainty. 146 The respondents were asked to indicate their level of
147
agreement with the doctor's assertion that abuse occurred in each case.
The third section asked respondents for their basic personal and professional
148
demographic data.
The Authors distributed the survey via listservs for judges and district
attorneys. Potential participants received an email that invited them to
participate in the study. The email provided a link to the online survey in
SurveyMonkey, an internet survey provider. The authors used SAS, a
statistical data analysis software, to analyze the results of the survey,
including frequency distributions for each question. While other tests did not
reveal any relevant, statistically significant results due to the divergence of
responses and resulting small sample sizes, the frequency results are
noteworthy because they highlight the vast differences in the understanding
of the phrase in the legal profession. 149
B. Results
1. DemographicData
The majority of respondents were legal professionals who had
practiced law for several decades.150 A total of 91 respondents completed the
survey, of whom 63.7 percent were court of common pleas judges, 27.5
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See infra Parts III.B.2.a, III.B.2.b.
See infra Part III.B.2.c.
See infra Part III.B.3.
See infra Part III.B.3.
See infra Part III.B.1.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
See infra Table 1.
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percent district attorneys, and 8.8 percent other.151 Most respondents
reported being in the legal profession for more than 30 years, and more than
85 percent reported more than 15 years of professional experience. 152 While
91 attorneys participated in the survey, not all respondents answered all
questions. 53
Table 1
Position& Experience (91 Respondents)

Age & Gender (63 Respondents)

Court of Common Pleas

63.7%

>50 years

71.4%

District Attorneys

27.5%

35 to 50 years

27.0%

Other

8.8%

25 to 34 years

1.2%

Male

73.0%

<15 years of experience

12.1%

Female

27.0%

16 to 30 years

46.2%

White (Non-Hispanic)

98.4%

>30 years

41.8%

African-American

1.6%

Respondents reported extensive professional experience with child
abuse cases and physician expert testimony.1 4 They also reported in their
experience almost all cases involving child abuse involved medical expert
testimony, and most medical experts testified for the prosecution. 155 Asked
about their experience over the past five years, the majority of respondents
(70.3 percent) reported calling or cross-examining expert witnesses in three
or fewer cases where the expert was the child's primary physician, while only
9.5 percent reported doing so in greater than 14 cases. 156 Cross-examination
of medical experts was similarly uncommon, with only 25.7 percent of
respondents having done so for greater than or equal to 9 cases. 157 Of note,
only 9 percent of respondents reported any prior training or formal
158
education regarding the meaning of RMC.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See infra Table 1.
See infra Table 1.
See infra Tables 1, 2.
See infra Table 2.
See infra Table 2.
See infra Table 2.
See infra Table 2.
See infra Figure 1.

Drake Law Review

[Vol. 66

2. Defining Reasonable Medical Certainty
Table 2
Participationin Cases with Suspected

Participationin Cases with Suspected Child

Abuse (86 Respondents):

Abuse Where PhysicianExpert Testified
(88 Respondents):

>30 cases

76.7%

Expert testimony offered

97.7%

11 to 30 cases

14.0%

Expert testimony not offered

2.3%

1 to 10 cases

9.3%
Testimony Offered By (74 Respondents):

Child'sPrimary Physician

Independent Medical Expert

0 to 3 cases

70.3%

0 to 3 cases

54.1%

4 to 8 cases

20.3%

4 to 8 cases

20.3%

>14 cases

9.5%

9 to 13 cases

12.2%

>14 cases

13.5%

Expert Testimony Offered for (85 Respondents):
Prosecution

88.2%

Defense

Roughly Equalfor

7.1%

Roughly Equalfor

Prosecutionand Defense,

0%
1.2%

Prosecutionand Defense,

Competing Experts
One-Sided Expert
*Note: The Percentages reflect the percentage of respondents, based on the total number
of respondents, who provided a particular answer.

This Part presents the respondents' definition of the phrase based on
two frameworks: numerical probability and ordinal probability.
a. Definition based on numerical probability. The survey asked the
respondents to provide information on prior training on the meaning of the
phrase, but fewer than 10 reported any form of training.15 9 As a follow-up
question, the survey asked respondents who reported prior training to
explain the definition of the phrase based on the information received during

159.

See infra Figure 1.
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training. The responses show stark, wide-ranging differences in the
understanding of the phrase. 160
Of the eight respondents who reported any training on the meaning of
RMC, there was wide variability in the numerical probability they equated
with RMC. 161 Two respondents indicated RMC could be as low as 5 percent
as the required threshold, two set the definition of RMC at 50 percent, two
set the threshold at 75 percent, and one each set the threshold at greater than
90 percent and 99 percent, respectively. 162 If these findings accurately reflect
the content of the education respondents received, it suggests at the very
least current training on RMC is far from consistent.
Figure 1
Numerical Definition Based on Training
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Similarly, no consensus emerged from the responses of the 66
individuals who answered the question of how great the likelihood of abuse
should be for medical experts to testify with reasonable medical certainty
that abuse occurred. 163 Using the numerical probability framework, the
majority of the respondents (64 out of 66) indicated that RMC required a
probability greater than 50 percent, with 18 percent setting a threshold
greater than 90 percent probability, and 17 percent setting a threshold of
greater than 95 percent. 164 Only two respondents set the threshold greater
than 25 percent probability, with one setting the threshold greater than 5
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See infra Figure
See infra Figure
See infra Figure
See infra Figure
See infra Figure

1.
1.
1.
2.
2.
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Figure 2
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b. Definition based on expected ordinalprobability.Respondents were
also asked to use an ordinal-probability framework to indicate how likely
child abuse had to be in order for a medical expert to testify that there was
reasonable medical certainty that abuse had occurred. 166 Again, 66
individuals provided a response, with the majority (71.2 percent) indicating
that child abuse had to be the most likely explanation for the child's
condition. 167 Less than one-fourth (22.7 percent) indicated child abuse could
be the second most likely explanation, and only four individuals (6.1
percent) indicated that child abuse could be the third most likely explanation
of the child's condition and still qualify as RMC.1 61

165.
166.
167.
168.

See infra Figure
See infra Figure
See infra Figure
See infra Figure

2.
3.
3.
3.
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Figure 3
Ordinal Probability
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c. Definition variation based on type of case and type of injury. Finally,
the respondents were asked to indicate whether, and how, the meaning of
RMC should vary in criminal versus family cases, and assault versus battery.
Roughly two-thirds of respondents (67.7 percent) indicated that the same
threshold definition should be used in both family and criminal cases, while
the vast majority (92.31 percent) made no distinction in their interpretation
of RMC in assault versus battery cases. Nearly one-third of respondents
(30.8 percent) indicated that a higher threshold should exist for criminal
cases than for family cases, although one respondent indicated that criminal
cases should have lower thresholds.
3. Court Hypotheticals
The third framework used to examine how legal professionals
interpreted expert testimony regarding RMC involved hypothetical court
cases. Respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point Likert-type scale
(1 indicating strongly agree, 5 indicating strongly disagree) whether they
agreed with the hypothetical medical expert testimony regarding RMC. The
responses of the 70 legal professionals who expressed their opinion are
shown in Table 3. As with the preceding frameworks, these responses
demonstrate no consensus regarding what constitutes reasonable medical
169
certainty.

169.

See infra Table 3, Figures 4--8.
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Table 3
Hypothetical

Strongly

Agree

Agree

Neither Agree nor

Disagree

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

1

0

7.14

25.71

30.00

37.14

2

0

11.43

42.86

31 .43

14.A'

3

0

17.14

42.86

30.00

10.00

47
i :.:
....
.. .
47.14

5 1...
15.71

88.57'
7.

4'
5

.......5 71 ..
37.14

:: 22.8,-'6
2
45.71

15.71

0

,

1.43

Hypothetical case 1 (three-year-old with a linear skull fracture)
The story you are told is that a young mother and her neighbor took
their three-year-old twin sons to the park to play. In the presence of
both parents, one of the boys fell from his wagon and struck his head
hard on the concrete. He cried vigorously but was consolable. Scalp
swelling developed quickly at the point of impact. Because he continued
to seem irritable, sleepy, and vomited twice that afternoon, the child's
mother and the neighbor brought him to the Emergency Department
for evaluation. His physical exam was normal except for a subgaleal
hematoma (bleeding between the skull and the brain). Skull films and
cranial CT scan confirmed a linear, parietal skull fracture and a small,
focal, acute (i.e., hyperdense) subdural hematoma underlying the
fracture. The mother of the child denied any form of inflicted trauma,
and both she and the neighbor were consistent in their accounts of the
event with repetition over time. Given this situation, would you agree if
a doctor testified to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the
abuse DID occur[.]

Responses to this case were heterogeneous, but nearly 70 percent
either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the testimony.1 70 No respondent
strongly agreed that abuse occurred, but nearly 10 percent reported
agreement with the expert witness testimony that abuse occurred. 171

170. See infra Figure 4.
171. See infra Figure 4.
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Figure 4
Hypothetical 1
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Hypothetical case 2 (toddler with no witness other than parents):
The story you are told is that the mother of a normally developing 14month-old girl discovered scalp swelling and tenderness while brushing
her daughter's hair. The next day, she took the child to her pediatrician,
who ordered skull X-rays that revealed a non-diastatic, linear, parietal
skull fracture. Concerned about child abuse, the pediatrician obtained a
skeletal survey and a cranial CT scan. Both studies were negative. The
parents of the child consistently denied accidental or inflicted head
trauma. Given this situation, would you agree if a doctor testified to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that the abuse DID occur[.]

Responses were again quite heterogeneous, with 42.9 percent of
respondents indicating they neither agreed nor disagreed with the expert
testimony, 11.4 percent reporting agreement, and 45.7 percent reporting
disagreement or strong disagreement. No respondent indicated strong
172
agreement.

172.

See infra Figure 5.
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Figure 5
Hypothetical 2
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Hypothetical case 3 (infant with mother as only witness)
The story you are told is that the mother of a six-month-old boy was
carrying him when she tripped and fell onto a linoleum floor, landing on
top of her son. She reports that he cried right away but remained fussy
and did not move his right arm much. After an hour or so, she decided
to bring him into the Emergency Department, where the boy's physical
examination was normal except for swelling and tenderness over his
right forearm, and swelling along his right temple. A skeletal survey
showed only a mid-shaft buckle fracture of the right radius; an
ophthalmology exam was unremarkable; and a cranial CT scan revealed
a small linear skull fracture and overlying subcutaneous tissue swelling.
The mother's story remained consistent with repetition over time.
Given this situation, would you agree if a doctor testified to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty that the abuse DID occur[.]

Responses were again quite heterogeneous, with 42.9 percent of
respondents indicating they neither agreed nor disagreed with the expert
testimony, 17.4 percent reporting agreement, and 40 percent reporting
disagreement or strong disagreement. 173 No respondent indicated strong
agreement.

174

173. See infra Figure 6.
174. See infra Figure 6.
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Hypothetical case 4 (one-year-old child with prolonged seizure
activity):
The story you are told is that a 12-month-old boy was admitted to the
intensive care unit in status epilepticus (i.e., prolonged seizure activity).
A CT scan revealed diffuse, bilateral brain swelling, with no evidence of
bleeding or fractures. An ophthalmologic exam did not demonstrate any
hemorrhages, nor did a skeletal survey find any evidence of fractures.
The father reported that he was at home alone with the baby when the
infant suddenly became unresponsive, limp, and stopped breathing for
"what seemed like a long time." According to the father, the boy had
been sick for the past 24 hours, with a fever and increased fussiness. The
father adamantly denied both accidental and inflicted trauma. Given
this situation, would you agree if a doctor testified to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty that the abuse DID occur[.]
Responses were again quite heterogeneous, with 47.1 percent of
respondents indicating they neither agreed nor disagreed with the expert
and 24.3
testimony, 28.6 percent reporting agreement or strong agreement,
175
percent reporting disagreement or strong disagreement.
175. See infra Figure 7.
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Figure 7
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Hypothetical case 5 (toddler with bone fractures in various stages of
healing):
The story you are told is that an 18-month-old girl was brought to clinic
for complaints of ear pain and fever. On exam, she had an upper
respiratory tract infection and possibly the beginning of an ear infection.
Additionally, she is extremely thin, with multiple bruises over her shins,
upper arms, and rib cage (front and back). A skeletal survey
demonstrates five rib fractures in various stages of healing, along with
significant callous deposits on the ulnar of her left arm and the fibula of
her right leg, suggestive of healed fractures. Her last clinic visit was at
13 months of age when she was noted to be underweight but developing
normally. Given this situation, would you agree if a doctor testified to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that the abuse DID occur[.]

In this case, the majority of respondents were in either agreement (45.7
percent) or strong agreement (37.1 percent) with the hypothetical expert
testimony regarding RMC. 176 Only 15.7 percent asserted neither agreement

176.

See infra Figure 8.
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nor disagreement, and only one respondent indicated strong disagreement
177
with the hypothetical expert testimony.
Figure 8
Hypothetical 5
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C. Limitations
The biggest limitation in the study is the sample size. The small sample
size precluded the Authors from conducting further statistical analysis,
which would allow for broader generalizations. Likewise, given the small
sample size, the survey participants may not be fully representative of the
legal professionals in Pennsylvania or the United States. Further research in
this area is warranted.
IV. ANALYSIS

The survey results reported here exhibit a remarkable lack of
agreement on the meaning of the term reasonable medical certainty and
highlight the need for guidance in its interpretation. 178 In order for expert
medical testimony regarding RMC to contribute to just verdicts in (often
high-stakes) child abuse cases, consistency or at least general consensus is
needed for interpreting RMC.1 79 This Part discusses the risks associated with
177.

See infra Figure 8.

178. See supra Part III.
179. See supra Part II.B.
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the kind of ambiguity demonstrated by the present survey results and
proposes several mechanisms to reduce such risks.
A. Ambiguity in the Legal and Medical Fields
The meaning of RMC has been shown to vary across jurisdictions. 180 A
prior national survey of the medical experts who frequently testify in court
about child abuse demonstrated widespread variability in how the medical
community interprets RMC. 181 Among medical experts who testify in court,
some assert that the phrase RMC is a legal term of art.182 But if this is so,
data suggest that legal experts have no more insight into the meaning of
RMC than physicians."8 3
The present survey of Pennsylvania legal professionals is illustrative
not only for its lack of consensus about RMC, but also for its finding that
training on the meaning of RMC is itself highly variable-employing
thresholds as low as 5 percent to as high as 99 percent probability.184 It is
possible that legal professionals do in fact understand the meaning of the
phrase, but cannot accurately articulate its meaning. However, the present
findings show large variability across multiple frameworks for understanding
how legal professionals interpret RMC: numerical probability, ordinal
probability, and applied judgment in hypothetical cases. 185
Though the results for the numerical probability framework show the
broadest spread, it is perhaps most striking that the possibility legal
professionals do in fact understand the meaning of the phrase is unlikely, as
illustrated by the lack of consensus as to the legal professionals' normative
views.18 6 Some equate the phrase to requiring 50 percent likelihood that
abuse occurred, while others require anywhere from 75 percent probability
to absolute certainty (i.e., 100 percent probability).' 7 A larger concern with
the spread is that someone's interpretation of the required threshold may be
extraordinarily difficult to compare to someone else's interpretations.

180. See supra Part II.A.
181. See supra Part II.C.
182. See, e.g., Glenn E. Bradford, Dissecting Missouri'sRequirement of "Reasonable

Medical Certainty",J. Mo. B., May/June 2001, at 136, 137.
183. See supra Part III.
184. See supra Part III.
185. See supra Part III.
186. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
187. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
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Imagine, for example, that an attorney's subjective 75 percent is equivalent
to another attorney's subjective 80 percent threshold. Clearly, there is no
reliable mechanism to identify such differences. The present survey results
from the Pennsylvania legal community are far too heterogeneous to draw
any conclusion, much less identify a normative consensus.
While the survey results for the ordinal probability framework
revealed the greatest consensus for interpreting RMC, nearly 30 percent of
respondents dissented from the proposition that to qualify as RMC, child
abuse must be the most likely explanation for a child's injuries or
condition.118 This means that nearly 30 percent of respondents accepted the
proposition that not even preponderance of the evidence was needed for
RMC, since only the most likely explanation can support the preponderance
189
of the evidence.
The fact that respondents' interpretations of RMC changed according
to the type of case (criminal versus family; battery versus assault) even more
clearly demonstrates that the current situation introduces unwarranted risk
to courts, and in particular to those seeking justice.1 90 It is, of course,
Pollyannaish to expect absolute consensus in any human endeavor.
However, the subjectivity evidenced in the hypothetical cases suggests the
need for greater common ground among those positioned to seek justice.1 91
B. The Risks Associated with the CurrentLack of Agreement
Child abuse cases involve highly sensitive allegations, as well as a
vulnerable population that depends on responsible professionals working
together to make sound judgments that protect the innocent. False negative
judgments perpetuate risk that can be life-threatening for children. False
positive judgments both offend justice and cause undue harm to the innocent
and their families.
1. False Negatives
Acquittals exemplify how constitutional safeguards function in
criminal cases. These cases often generate little notoriety, making false
negatives difficult to accurately identify.192 In fact, the phrases "wrongful
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See supra Part III.B.2.b.
See supra Part III.B.2.b.
See supra Part III.B.2.c.
See supra Part III.B.2.c.
Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 Nw.
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acquittal" and "false negative" are almost legally nonsensical because an
acquittal indicates that the fact finders lacked sufficient evidence to return a
guilty verdict. 193 If the fact finders did not have sufficient evidence, then how
can a defendant be wrongfully acquitted? 194 In cases of alleged child abuse,
an acquittal may be based on lack of evidence even though the defendant
actually harmed the child and demonstrable consequences of that harm
persist.1 95
The case of James Marzolf in New Jersey exemplifies the danger of
lack of recourse in child abuse cases where an expert provides testimony
casting doubt on the child abuse charges. 196 Marzolf found himself facing
sexual abuse charges when his nephew disclosed abuse after the boy's
stepfather walked into the room and found Marzolf with his hand inside the
boy's pants. 197 The family endured a taint hearing, in which the trial court
would decide whether to admit the child's testimony in court during trial due
to pretrial issues. 198 During the hearing, Bruck, a leading suggestibility expert
in the country, criticized the mother and stepfather. 199 Bruck attempted to
discredit the stepfather, claiming his story changed throughout time.2 ° As
for the mother, Bruck claimed she used suggestive questions to interrogate
her son between his first and second interview with Sergeant Hassim, which
led to the boy's answers during the second interview. 201 To be clear, Bruck
explained that she could not be sure what the mother allegedly told her son,
U. L. REV. 1297, 1298-99 (2000) (explaining that an acquittal proves that "the right to
counsel, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, [and] the presumption of
innocence" function properly in the criminal justice system); see also Thomas D. Lyon
et al., Wrongful Acquittals of Sexual Abuse, 32 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 805, 806

(2017) (describing the difficulty of locating cases where acquittals occur because
acquittals are immune from appeals due to double jeopardy concerns and because court
reporters are not mandated to create a transcript of the court notes unless there is an
appeal).
193. See Lyon et al., supra note 192, at 819.

194. See id.
195. See id. at 808-09, 819 (describing the acquittal of Alejandro Avila for lack of

evidence in a sexual molestation case, the impact on the victim children, and a
subsequent conviction for the murder of a different child).
196. See Ross E. CHEIT, THE WITCH-HUNT NARRATIVE: POLITICS, PSYCHOLOGY,
AND THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 391 (2014) (describing the Marzolf case).
197. See id. at 390-91.
198. See id. at 391.

199. Id. at 392.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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22
but Bruck had a "feeling" the mother tainted the boy's responses. 0

While the judge was not convinced by Bruck's "feeling" and instead
relied on the testimony of a psychologist testifying on behalf of the state, the
consequences were catastrophic. 20 3 The family did not want to go to trial
after enduring two years of trial-like procedures, which made the family feel
as though they were the defendants.2 ° The family refused to cooperate any
further and moved away, and the prosecution dropped the charges in
December 1997.205 Marzolf also moved away to Pennsylvania, where he
opened a karate school. 2°6 In 2002, Marzolf was arrested for possession of
pleaded
child pornography and nine counts of child abuse, and eventually
27
0
molestation.
child
and
pornography
child
of
guilty to possession
Similarly, the case of Alejandro Avila illustrates the risks of an
ambiguous definition of RMC and the challenge of accurately identifying
false negatives.20 8 Avila faced child abuse charges after his girlfriend's nineyear-old daughter and her nine-year-old cousin disclosed years-long sexual
abuse.2°9 The girls explained the defendant fondled their chest and vaginal
areas, and penetrated them with objects, fingers, and his penis.210 However,
as often is the case with sexual abuse, there were no physical findings from
the medical exam. 21 1 The girls' stories were the main evidence presented at

trial, and the jury acquitted the defendant. 212 Recognizing the state's inability
of
to seek further recourse, the defendant subsequently boasted, because 213
double jeopardy, "[he] could do anything [he] want[ed] to that little girl.
if
It is difficult to claim that the defendant was guilty because, presumably, 214
enough evidence existed, then the jury would have found him guilty.

However, a few years later, six-year-old Samantha Runnion was kidnapped
from outside her home and later found dead with signs of having been
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id. at 392-93.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lyon et al., supra note 192, at 808.
Id. at 808-09.
Id. at 809.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 820.
See id. at 819.
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raped. 215 In this instance, Alejandro Avila was charged and convicted for
Samantha's rape and murder because of DNA evidence found under
216
Samantha's fingernails and in Avila's vehicle.
The risks of returning child predators to the community are evidenced
by recidivism data.21 7 Such perpetrators are likely to reoffend as late as 15 to
20 years after their first incident of abuse, and recidivism rates are
themselves often underestimated. 218 To the extent that false negatives can be
diminished by propagating a clear and defensible definition of RMC, risk
will be diminished. 219 The fact that defendants can appeal wrongful
convictions but that states are unable to appeal an acquittal because of
double jeopardy should give legal and medical professionals pause and
encourage these professionals to present evidence in the most clear and
coherent manner the first time. 220
2. False Positives
Julie Baumer was convicted of inflicting massive brain injuries on her
six-week-old nephew, whom she was caring for while her sister (the child's
mother) struggled with drug addiction.22 1 Two expert physicians testifying for
the prosecution concluded that the infant's brain damage was likely inflicted
by Baumer, who had sole custody of the child. 222 The defense did not offer
any expert testimony, and Baumer was convicted of child abuse and

215.
216.

Id.
Id.

217. See generally ANDREW J. R. HARRIS & KARL HANSON, SEX OFFENDER
RECIDIVISM: A SIMPLE QUESTION 7 (2004) (describing the different recidivism patterns
by age, type of abuse, and type of abusers).
218. Robert A. Prentky, Austin F. S. Lee, Raymond A. Knight & David Cerce,
Recidivism Rates Among Child Molesters and Rapists: A Methodological Analysis, 21
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 635,650-56 (1997).
219. See Lyon et al., supra note 192, at 819.
220. Id.
221. Laura Candler, Julie Baumer."Wrongfully Convicted of Child Abuse, AM. PUB.
MEDIA: STORY (June 11, 2013), http://www.thestory.org/stories/2013-06/julie-baumerwrongfully-convicted-child-abuse; Katie Vloet, ExonoreeJulie Baumer Shares Story with
MLaw Students, MICH. L. UNIV. MICH. (Oct. 6, 2016) https://www.law.umich.edu/
newsandinfo/features/Pages/baumer mic_100616.aspx ("She was found guilty based
largely on the testimony of two physicians who testified for the prosecution, saying that
the baby must have been shaken for the injuries to have occurred."); see also People v.
Baumer, No. 267373, 2007 WL 1095236, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2007).
222. Baumer, 2007 WL 1095236, at "1, *3.
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sentenced to 10 to 15 years in prison.22 3 The Michigan Law Innocence Clinic
successfully appealed her case, based in large part on the testimony of six
prominent physicians who concluded that the child's brain damage was due
to a stroke, not shaking. 22 4 One is left to wonder what interpretation of RMC
was used by the prosecution's expert witnesses, and whether Ms. Baumer
might have been spared seven years in prison had there been a consistent
and transparent definition for what counts as RMC. 225
Medical testimony was also crucial in securing a conviction
of four women convicted of raping two young girls. 226 The same
recanted testimony was crucial in freeing the four women. 22 7
granted the women habeas relief and declared them
acknowledging the following:

in the case
physician's
The court
innocent,

Given the implausible and contradictory nature of the allegations,
Dr. Kellogg's medical testimony was crucial to the case. It was the only
piece of evidence that could show a crime had ever occurred. Not
surprisingly, this opinion testimony was central to the State's theory of
criminal liability. From opening argument, to closing argument, there
were two themes in both trials: the girls' stories were22 8inconsistent, but
that didn't matter in light of Dr. Kellogg's testimony.
Both stories underscore the gravitas that medical testimony receives in
court and the repercussions suffered from false positives. While the women
are free, the turmoil and years lost in prison cannot be recuperated. These
cases also highlight the importance of providing the best medical opinion
possible in child abuse cases, which includes a better approach to using the
phrase.
C. Mechanisms for Risk Reduction
Two possible alternatives for reducing the risk associated with RMC in

223. Id. at *5; see also Vloet, supra note 221 ("Her attorney would not bring in a
radiologist to examine the baby's brain scans, so the opinions of the prosecution experts
were not challenged.").
224. Vloet, supra note 221.
225. See id.
226. Ex parte Mayhugh, 512 S.W.3d 285,304 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
227. Id. at 320 (Alcala, J., concurring) ("[I]t is now her expert medical opinion that
she 'cannot determine with reasonable medical certainty whether [V.L.'s] hymen had
ever been injured at the time of the 1994 examination."' (second alteration in original)).
228. Id. at 304.
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child abuse legal proceedings are to remove it from the legal lexicon or
clarify its meaning. This Part presents how the risks may be reduced with
either alternative and how they each might serve the best interests of the
children.
1. Removing the Phrasefrom the Legal Lexicon
The appeal of removing RMC from the legal lexicon is its simplicity
and avoidance of ambiguity. At least one jurisdiction has adopted this
approach. 229 Colorado focuses on the admissibility of the physician's
testimony rather than on the sufficiency of evidence (which is often
2 30
predicated on the magical and substantively lacking phrase RMC).
Colorado courts instead ensure that medical testimony is relevant to the fact
finders, reliable based on sound scientific grounds, and not prejudiced.23'
This focus on the admissibility of expert physician testimony has the
advantage of clear and demonstrable criteria. By contrast, in many
jurisdictions the phrase RMC serves as both a standard for admissibility and
a conclusion. 232 The risk of such dual use is that RMC becomes almost a
tautology, insofar as the phrase is necessary for expert opinion to have
233
evidentiary weight, but also de facto concludes debate of the finding.
2. Providinga Uniform Definition
As a model definition, providing a numerical threshold has both
advantages and drawbacks. 234 Research has established the lay public has
difficulty applying percentages, which could lead to confusion in the
courtroom.2 3 1 One can imagine jurors struggling to discern how much weight
to attach to conflicting expert testimony. Likewise, medical experts might be
hesitant to defend their calculation of 70 percent versus 90 percent
confidence. By contrast, the use of ordinal ranking offers at least a lower

229. People v. Ramirez, 155 P.3d 371, 375 (Colo. 2007) (en banc).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 378-80. The multi-prong test states that the testimony must be relevant
under CRE 401 and 402, reliable and relevant under CRE 702, and not substantially
outweighed by concerns (e.g., prejudice) detailed under CRE 403. Id. at 378.
232. See supra Part II.
233. See Ramirez, 155 P.3d at 375; supraPart II.B.
234. See Earl F. Rose, The Medical Expert and the Lawsuit, 16 S.D. L. REV. 1, 17

(1971).
235. Id.
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limit of admissibility. 236 If the testifying medical expert cannot at least assert
that child abuse is the most likely explanation of a child's condition, it is not
clear why child abuse should be concluded by a court of law. That said, it
would be important to make sure that all involved are clear that the
likelihood of "the most likely explanation" depends on the probability of the
23 7
alternative explanations.
Model definitions and statutes are workable and common in the legal
field 238 and, as a legal term of art, the phrase may be more accepted than in
the medical field.239 Certainly, to the extent that RMC is a term invented and
propagated by lawyers and judges, it makes sense that the legal field should
take the initiative to provide clarity and guidance on the meaning of the
phrase.2 40 Moreover, if the medical field were to create a meaning of the
phrase, the medical field would have to find a way to communicate the
definition to the legal field and would have to ensure that the definition
meets all the legal critera. The American Bar Association may be best
positioned to develop a model definition of RMC in collaboration with
medical professionals. 241 Such collaboration is important to ensure both the
validity and acceptance of the meaning the phrase should have in both legal
and medical fields. If the final definition of the phrase is understood in the
legal community but is poorly understood in the medical community, the
risks will continue to persist. Cross-collaboration helps to ease the
translation between the legal and medical field by providing feedback from
the medical community as to the understanding of the meaning of the
phrase.

236. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
237. Benjamin H. Levi & Georgia Brown, Reasonable Suspicion, A Study of
PennsylvaniaPediatriciansRegarding Child Abuse, 116 PEDIATRICS e5, e5 (2005).
238. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (AM. BAR Ass'N 2017) ("The
Model Rules were adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association
on August 2, 1983. At the time this edition went to press, all but eight of the jurisdictions
had adopted new professional standards based on these Model Rules."); Model Penal
Code, ALI, https://www.ali.org/publications/show/model-penal-code/ (last visited Feb.
11, 2018) ("This seminal work played an important part in the widespread revision and
codification of the substantive criminal law of the United States. Respected and
influential, it is still cited by courts.").
239. Bradford, supra note 182, at 137 ("[M]any lawyers and judges believe the phrase
is a medical term of art. Physician commentators, however, have described the phrase as
a legal term of art.").
240. See supra Part II.
241. See supra text accompanying note 239.
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Dissemination of the meaning of the phrase would require a concerted
effort. Once the final model meaning of the phrase is presented, the legal
entity, such as the American Bar Association, and the medical entity, such
as the American Medical Association can further promote the uniform
definition by issuing a joint guidance. The joint guidance would further
support the use of the phrase. Finally, in order to change the current general
use of the phrase, the new meaning of the phrase must reach the courtroom
proceedings in child abuse cases. 242 To reach the experts and legal
professionals who partake in child abuse cases, legal and medical
professionals can teach others about the meaning of the phrase through
trainings, such as the continuing legal education required trainings in the
field. A salient issue with this method is finding individuals able and willing
to train others in the medical and legal fields. An alternative solution that
circumvents this issue is for judges and attorneys to present the model
definition during the court proceedings when the experts are to present
expert testimony. The attorneys or judges could then ask the testifying
expert whether, given the definition, the expert can qualify the conclusion
with the phrase RMC. This would also allow all parties present in the
courtroom to have a shared understanding of what the phrase means.
V. CONCLUSION

The use of reasonable medical certainty has been inconsistent for
decades, offering little guidance to either the testifying expert or those who
must interpret their testimony. 243 Particularly in cases involving child abuse,
the current use of RMC is indefensible because it introduces unwarranted
risk. 244 Collaboration between legal and medical experts could provide
clarity and thereby consistency, which in turn could both promote justice and
decrease risk in high-stakes cases involving child abuse.

242.
243.
244.

See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Parts II, III.
See supra Part IV.B.

